不对称信息下基于委托代理模型的BIM推广研究  

BIM promotion based on principal-agent model under asymmetric information

作　　者：高旭阔[1] 刘雨轩 严梦婷 GAO Xukuo;LIU Yuxuan;YAN Mengting(School of Management,Xi′an Univ.of Arch.&Tech.,Xi′an 710055,China)

机构地区：[1]西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710055

出　　处：《西安建筑科技大学学报（自然科学版）》2020年第4期610-616,共7页Journal of Xi'an University of Architecture & Technology(Natural Science Edition)

摘　　要：BIM技术的应用对传统建筑业带来了全新的机遇与挑战,高速且有效的建筑信息传递能力给原有利益主体间存在的不对称信息带来了巨大的冲击,一定程度上压缩了承包商通过信息优势获取利润的空间,业主与承包商原有的利益均衡将被打破,同时新的利益均衡状态需要制定全新的激励机制相配合.结合建设工程项目应用BIM技术后的实际状况,论文引入信息不对称变量i用以探究引入BIM技术后业主与承包方的利益均衡状态,同时增加负激励函数对传统委托代理模型进行修正用以构建更加合理的激励机制.通过模型求解表明:承包商的努力程度与其技术水平和信息不对称程度呈正相关,与不良行为发生的可能性呈负相关;BIM技术的应用会使承包商采取不良行为.消除不良行为,增加承包商对BIM技术接受度的途径是根据承包商面临的风险强度和信息不对称程度设置强度相当的负激励机制.BIM technology has brought new opportunities and challenges to the traditional construction industry.The high-speed and effective construction information transmission capability has brought a huge impact on the asymmetric information existing between the original stakeholders,and has compressed contractors to a certain extent.The space for obtaining profit through information advantages will break the original balance of interests between the owner and the contractor,and the new balance of interests requires the development of a new incentive mechanism to cooperate.By analyzing the actual situation,the paper introduces the information asymmetry variable i to explore the balance of interests between the owner and the contractor after the introduction of BIM technology,and at the same time adds a negative incentive function to modify the traditional principal-agent model for construction A more reasonable incentive mechanism.The model solution shows that the contractor’s effort is positively related to its technical level and information asymmetry,and negatively related to the possibility of bad behavior;The application of BIM technology will cause contractors to take bad behavior.The way to eliminate bad behaviors and increase contractors′acceptance of BIM technology is to set up a negative incentive mechanism with a similar strength according to the risk intensity and information asymmetry faced by contractors.

关 键 词：BIM 委托代理模型 信息不对称 博弈 负激励机制 

分 类 号：TU17[建筑科学—建筑理论]