具有网络外部性的在线服务平台性能投资及广告定价决策研究  

Research on Performance Investment and Advertising Pricing Decisions of Online Service Platform with Network Externalities

作　　者：史丽丽 林军[1] SHI Lili;LIN Jun(Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an,China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安市710049

出　　处：《管理学报》2020年第6期917-923,共7页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助面上项目(71672140,71371149);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划资助项目(2015JM7379)。

摘　　要：为了平衡用户体验和企业利润,由广告商赞助的在线服务平台需要决定对平台性能的投资水平和广告定价策略。以由广告商赞助的具有直接和间接网络外部性的在线服务平台为研究对象,基于三阶段博弈模型,探讨垄断场景和双寡头场景下的平台性能投资和广告定价策略。研究表明:平台的性能投资和广告定价均随该平台的直接网络外部性的增大而增大,垄断场景下平台应重点关注用户粘性提升;而双寡头场景下平台之间的替代性越强,用户和广告商越容易转向对方平台,平台应不断提升差异化竞争能力,减小平台对直接网络外部性的依赖。In order to balance user experience and enterprise profit,the online service platform sponsored by advertisers needs to determine the level of investment in platform performance and advertising pricing strategy.In this study,the online service platform with direct and indirect network externalities sponsored by advertisers is taken as the research object.Based on the three-stage game model,the platform performance investment and advertising pricing strategies in monopoly and duopoly scenarios are studied.The results show that:the performance investment and advertising pricing of the platform increase with the increase of the platform’s direct network externality,and the platform should focus on the improvement of user stickiness in the monopoly scenario;while in the duopoly scenario,the stronger the substitution between platforms,the easier it is for users and advertisers to turn to the other platform,and the platform should continue to improve the differentiated competitiveness and reduce the platform’s reliance on direct network externalities.

关 键 词：性能投资 网络外部性 广告赞助 在线服务 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]