企业房地产投资偏向之谜?——来自地方经济增长考核压力的解释  

The Mystery of Corporate Real Estate Investment Bias?——An Explanation from the Pressure of Local Economic Growth Assessment

作　　者：乐云[1] 林洪波[1] LE Yun;LIN Hong-bo(School of Economics&Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《经济体制改革》2020年第5期186-191,共6页Reform of Economic System

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目“重大基础设施工程的组织行为与模式创新研究”(71390523);国家自然科学基金面上项目“政府投资建设项目中‘隧道行为’的机理、动态演化及对策研究”(71172107)。

摘　　要：企业对房地产投资活动的过度偏向,导致了中国实体经济的脱实向虚和产业空心化。本文基于中国上市企业2007~2018年数据,着重分析"地方经济增长考核压力—企业房地产投资"的影响及其机制问题。研究发现,地方经济增长考核压力越大,则会驱动企业房地产投资活动强度的提升。特别地,不同属性特征的企业,在面对政府经济增长考核压力时有着显著的异质性表现。地方经济增长考核压力越大,从宏观机制上来看,更容易带来政府的财政收支失衡,并强化了对土地财政的依赖;从微观机制上来看,则会导致企业的融资约束加大,并强化企业的金融套利能动性。The excessive bias of enterprises in real estate investment activities has led to the disengagement of China’s real economy and the hollowing out of industries.Based on the 2007-2018 data set of Chinese listed companies,this article focuses on the analysis of the impact and mechanism of"local economic growth assessment pressure-corporate real estate investment".The study finds that the greater the pressure on the assessment of local economic growth,it will drive the increase in the intensity of corporate real estate investment activities.In particular,enterprises with different attributes and characteristics have significant heterogeneity when facing the pressure of government economic growth assessment.The greater the pressure on the assessment of local economic growth,from the perspective of the macro mechanism,it is easy to bring the government’s fiscal revenue and expenditure imbalance,and strengthen the dependence on land finance;from the perspective of the micro mechanism,it will lead to enterprise increased financing constraints and strengthened corporate financial arbitrage initiative.

关 键 词：地方经济增长考核压力 企业房地产投资 异质性特征 机制路径 

分 类 号：F812.4[经济管理—财政学]