禁牧政策下农户与政府行为的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of Farmers and Government behavior under Prohibiting Grazing Policy

作　　者：陈勇 王睿 周立华 侯彩霞 CHEN Yong;WANG Rui;ZHOU Lihua;HOU Caixia(Key Laboratory of Desert and Desertification,Northwest Institute of Eco-Environment and Resources,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Lanzhou Gansu 730000,China;College of Land and Resources,China West Normal University,Nanchong Sichuan 637009,China;Institutes of Science and Development,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China;School of Management,Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi'an Shaanxi 710055,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学院西北生态环境资源研究院沙漠与沙漠化重点实验室,甘肃兰州730000 [2]西华师范大学国土资源学院,四川南充637009 [3]中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院,北京100190 [4]西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710055

出　　处：《生态经济》2020年第10期119-122,共4页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“典型沙漠化逆转区的生态承载力与脆弱性评价”(41601587);西华师范大学博士科研启动基金项目"生态政策对四川省阿坝州牧户经济结构与幸福指数的影响研究"(17E039);四川省社会科学重点研究基地一四川循环经济研究中心2019年度项目“典型生态脆弱区贫困与生态环境耦合机制及调控管理研究”(XXJJ-1910)。

摘　　要：禁牧政策的实施取得了一定的成绩,但是也存在一些问题,影响了政策的实施效果。其中一个重要的原因就是禁牧前后农户的收益问题。从博弈论的视角探讨禁牧政策实施中的行为主体关系有利于禁牧成果的巩固和持续推进。通过构建动态博弈模型,分析农户与政府的利益互动关系,得出目前我国禁牧政策中违规放牧现象存在的主要原因是政策的“一刀切”问题,而通过实行差别禁牧、差别补偿及产业结构调整等措施可确保禁牧效果的可持续。The implementation of prohibiting grazing policy has made some achievements,but there are still some problems that affected the implementation effect.One of the important reasons is that the difference in income of farmers before and after prohibiting grazing policy.To consolidate and continue to promote the achievements of prohibiting grazing policy,we discussed the relationship between the actors in the implementation of the policy of prohibition from the perspective of game theory.By constructing a dynamic game model,we analyzed the interactive relationship between farmers and the government.The results reflected the main cause of the illegal grazing phenomenon is the policy of“one size fits all”,and through the implementation of measures between differential grazing,differential compensation and adjustment of industrial structure can ensure the sustainable prohibiting grazing effect.

关 键 词：禁牧政策 违规放牧 政府行为 博弈 

分 类 号：F326.3[经济管理—产业经济] X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程]