创新效率视角下SEP拒绝许可行为的反垄断法责任分析--以FTC诉高通案为切入  

Analysis on the Anti-monopoly Law Responsibility of SEP Rejecting Licensing from the Perspective of Innovation Efficiency:from the Perspective of FTC v.Qualcomm

作　　者：石巍 任天一 Shi Wei;Ren Tianyi(Law School,Nankai University,Tianjin 300350,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学法学院,天津300350

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2020年第17期133-141,共9页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家留学基金委员会项目“国家建设高水平大学公派研究生项目”(20183101)。

摘　　要：反垄断法对拒绝许可行为的规制需平衡创新效率与竞争效率。对标准必要专利权人拒绝许可行为合法性的考察需比较标准化活动对创新效率的增加与对市场竞争效率的减损。从全产业链角度看标准化活动,标准化虽降低了上游技术市场的竞争,却增加了下游标准化产品市场的产量及竞争活动。高通公司作为芯片研发市场的上游企业,拒绝将芯片生产技术许可给竞争性芯片生产商的行为并未对下游手机生产市场的竞争状况造成损害,强行在芯片制造环节引入竞争不会对下游手机产品市场带来利益,反而影响上游芯片研发市场的创新效率。It is necessary for Anti-monopoly Law to balance innovation efficiency and competition efficiency when regulating intellectual propertyrefusalactivities.The examination of the legality of the standard essential patentee’s refusal needs to weigh the innovation efficiency and the impairment of the market competition efficiencybrought by the standardization activities.From the perspective of the entire industry chain,Standardization has increased the production and competition activities of the downstream standardized product market.As an upstream company in the chips R&D market,Qualcomm’s refusal to license SEPsto competitive chip manufacturers has not caused damage to the competition in the downstream mobile phone production market.Forcing the introduction of competition in the chip manufacturing sector will not bring benefits to the downstream market of mobile phones,which in turn affects the innovation efficiency of the upstream chip R&D market.

关 键 词：拒绝许可 标准必要专利 高通案 反垄断责任 创新效率 

分 类 号：D912.29[政治法律—民商法学]