产能限制下纵向持股的上游企业竞争与产能投资效应研究  

The Effects of Passive Vertical Integration Subject to Capacity Constraints on Upstream Competition and Capacity Investment

作　　者：杨剑侠[1] 张杰[1] Yang Jianxia;Zhang Jie

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

出　　处：《世界经济》2020年第9期122-146,共25页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“企业交叉持股的长期竞争效应研究:基于反垄断的视角”(71773030);上海市浦江人才计划(C类)“异质性企业交叉持股的竞争效应研究”(17PJC024)的资助。

摘　　要：本文探讨了当企业存在产能限制时后向持股和前向持股产生的上游企业竞争和产能投资效应。研究表明,无论上游企业是否存在产能限制,当下游企业存在产能限制时,与无持股情形相比,后向持股有利于上游合谋的达成;相反,前向持股则会促进上游企业竞争。进而,后向持股会削弱上游企业进行产能投资的动力,但前向持股会增强上游企业的产能投资激励。因此,后向持股虽然有利于处于上游的传统制造业企业实现去产能目标,但会以促进上游企业合谋为代价;而前向持股既有利于促进上游产业竞争,也能激励上游新兴产业的企业增加产能投资。This paper investigates the effects of passive backward integration(PBI)and passive forward integration(PFI)subject to capacity constraints on upstream competition and capacity investment.The study indicates that in the case of downstream capacity constraints PBI facilitates upstream collusion,whilst PFI hinders the cartelization of upstream firms,regardless of the presence of upstream capacity constraints.PBI can also encourage upstream firms to decrease their production capacity,while PFI can potentially strengthen the motivation of upstream firms to enhance their capacity investments.As a result,the derived policy implications are as follows:firstly,PBI can help the central government to some extent to achieve the purpose of reducing the capacity of traditional manufacturing industries,but at the expense of facilitating upstream collusion;secondly,PFI promotes upstream competition and potentially motivates investments in upstream capacity.

关 键 词：后向持股 前向持股 产能限制 上游合谋 产能投资 

分 类 号：D43[政治法律—政治学]