中国集体林权分割、动态博弈与制度变迁  

Collective Forest Tenure Division, Dynamic Game and Institutional Change in China

作　　者：李敏[1] 谢屹[1] 王静[2] Li Min;Xie Yi;Wang Jing(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Forestry University,Beijing 100083,China;School of Public Administration,Guizhou University of Finance and Economics,Guiyang 550025,China)

机构地区：[1]北京林业大学经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]贵州财经大学公共管理学院,贵阳550025

出　　处：《世界林业研究》2020年第4期56-61,共6页World Forestry Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金“集中连片特困区农户技术选择及其生产经营收入的空间溢出效用研究”(71503058);贵州财经大学校级项目“新一轮集体林权制度下农户林业经营行为研究”(2017XZC01)。

摘　　要：加强集体林权分割与博弈的研究,对于明确集体林权制度变迁方向、提高集体林权制度的运行效率具有重要意义。文中结合耦合理论,运用动态博弈方法解释中华人民共和国成立以来不同产权分割下集体林权制度变迁过程。研究结论为:1)集体林权分割是主要利益主体之间实现良性耦合的前提;2)当利益主体的策略是耦合策略时,子系统之间暂时实现良性耦合;3)中央政府策略表达倾向过渡为以服务合作为主导;4)政府制订集体林权策略需考虑村落环境,重视农民合理的利益诉求。Strengthening the research on the division and game of collective forest tenure is of great significance for clarifying the dynamic change direction of collective forest tenure system and improving the operational efficiency of collective forest tenure system. This paper explains the change process of the collective forest tenure system under the different property rights division since the founding of the People’s Republic of China using the dynamic game method in combination with the coupling theory. The conclusions are as follows: 1) The division of collective forest tenure is the premise of achieving a benign coupling between the main stakeholders;2) When the strategy of the interest subject is a coupling strategy, the subsystems temporarily achieve a benign coupling;3) The central government strategy tends to be service-oriented from the expression tendency;and 4) The starting point of the government in developing collective forest tenure strategy needs to consider the village environment and pay attention to the farmers’ reasonable interests.

关 键 词：集体林权分割 动态博弈 制度变迁 耦合理论 中国 

分 类 号：F321.1[经济管理—产业经济]