董事高管责任保险与融资约束——基于创新型保险产品的经验证据  

Directors and Officers liability insurance and financing constraints:Empirical evidence based on innovative insurance products

作　　者：李翠芝[1] LI Cuizhi(College of Business,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030031,P.R.China)

机构地区：[1]山西大学商务学院,山西太原030031

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第5期83-101,共19页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“中国服务业出口贸易与OFDI互动发展的机制及其生产率效应”(17CJY047);山西省软科学研究项目“互联网+背景下物流诚信共享信息构成要素及交换标准研究”(2017041018-5);山西省高等学校科学研究优秀成果培育项目“异质性服务企业对外直接投资动机研究”(2019SK075)。

摘　　要：董责险是针对公司董事、监事及高级职员在行使其职责时所产生的错误或疏忽等不当行为进行赔偿的保险,属于近年来创新型保险产品,也是保险公司新的利润增长点。通过手工收集董责险数据,探讨了上市公司董责险购买与融资约束之间的关系。研究发现,相对于未购买董责险的企业,购买了董责险的企业有更高的融资约束程度,两者之间的正向关系主要体现在非国有企业、两职合一企业以及市场化程度较低地区公司。上述研究结论经过系列内生性检验后仍然稳健。文章的研究结论对于我国资本市场上董责险的应用具有重要的实践意义。Directors and Officers liability insurance is insurance against compensation for errors or negligent misconduct generated by the company’s directors,supervisors and senior staff in the exercise of their duties.This paper studies the relationship between Directors and Officers liability insurance and financing constraints with the Directors and Officers liability insurance data,which was collected manually.This paper found that,compared with companies that did not purchase Directors and Officers liability insurance,companies which purchased directors’liability insurance had a higher degree of financing constraints.The positive relationship between Directors and Officers liability insurance and financing constraints was mainly reflected in non-state-owned enterprises,boarder and CEO are the same person and regions with low marketization.Those studies are still robust after passing a series of endogenous tests.The research of the thesis has important practical significance for the application of directors’liability in the capital market.

关 键 词：公司董事 公司高管 责任保险 融资约束 创新型保险产品 

分 类 号：F842.69[经济管理—保险] F832.51