威胁化解论:机构投资者诚信义务之制度建构与法理证成  

Theory of Treat Solution: Regulation Construction and Jurisprudential Evidence of Institutional Investors’ Fiduciary Duty

作　　者：吴双 WU Shuang(School of Law,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China)

机构地区：[1]清华大学法学院,北京100084

出　　处：《税务与经济》2020年第5期1-8,共8页Taxation and Economy

基　　金：2018年国家社科基金重大项目“互联网经济的法治保障研究”(项目编号:18ZDA149)。

摘　　要：机构投资者在资本市场上的"野蛮"入侵严重威胁中小投资主体的利益。"威胁化解论"认为强势资本对弱势资本存在"威胁",因而资本在原初状态下呈现对立态势,而公司契约通过诚信义务条款能有效化解威胁,创造实质公平的营商环境,消除资本对立并促进合作。诚信义务作为公司契约中破除威胁的工具,旨在限制个别主体过于强大的实力,为资本从对立走向合作提供必要的条件。诚信义务应按照机构投资者在公司治理中能够对利益攸关者构成威胁的程度进行分配。法律应当明确以行使投票权作为识别机构投资者的标准。机构投资者应对目标公司及其利益攸关者承担忠实义务、勤勉义务,并进行相应的信息披露。The“barbaric”invasion of institutional investors in the capital market seriously threatens the interests of small and medium-sized investors.The“threat resolution theory”believes that strong capital has a“threat”to weak capital.Therefore,capital displays opposite situation in its original stage.The corporate contract can effectively resolve the threat through fiduciary duty and create a substantially fair business environment.It can not only eliminate capital opposition,but also promote cooperation.The fiduciary duty,as a tool for eliminating threats in corporate contracts,aims to limit the strength because its subject is too powerful and provide the necessary conditions for capital to move from opposition to cooperation.The fiduciary duty should be allocated according to the degree to which institutional investors can pose a threat to stakeholders in corporate governance.The law should clearly regard the exercise of voting rights as the criterion for identifying institutional investors.Institutional investors should assume the duty of loyalty and the duty of care to the target company and make corresponding information disclosures.

关 键 词：威胁化解论 机构投资者 诚信义务 公司契约 

分 类 号：F830.39[经济管理—金融学]