激励与惩罚:城市生活垃圾源头分类中的主体行为分析——基于演化博弈的视角  

Incentive and Punishment:Analysis of Subject Behaviors in Source Classification of City Life Garbage——From the Perspective of Evolution and Game

作　　者：高明 吴雨瑶[1,2] GAO Ming;WU Yu-yao(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou Fujian 350116,China;Fujian Green Development Institute,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou Fujian 350116,China)

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350116 [2]福州大学福建绿色发展研究院,福建福州350116

出　　处：《太原理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第5期47-57,共11页Journal of Taiyuan University of Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“促进‘城市矿产’开发利用的多主体协同机制研究”(18BGL176)。

摘　　要：绿色发展已成为当今世界的重要命题,推行生活垃圾分类是顺应这一发展潮流的必然举措。文章将城市居民和垃圾收运企业捆绑在一起视为分类源头主体,运用演化博弈方法建立双方博弈模型,并将政府规制手段引入模型中,分析不同情况下的演化均衡策略。通过仿真模拟,在政府严格治理下发现奖励和惩罚政策都能推动垃圾分类,但惩罚性政策比激励性政策更为有效。此外,提高企业创收会提升分类效果。最后,针对结果文章提出相应的政策建议。Green development has become an important proposition nowadays,and garbage sorting is thus the necessary measure to respond to the tendency.The paper regards the combination of urban residents and waste collection and transportation enterprises as the subject of sorting source,establishes the bilateral game model through evolutional game method,and introduces the government regulations into the model to analyze the evolution balance strategy under different circumstances.The analogue simulation has found that under strict control of the government,both incentive and punishment policies can promote garbage sorting,but punishment is more effective than incentive.In addition,improving profits of garbage sorting enterprises can facilitate the sorting effect.In the end,corresponding policy recommendations were proposed according to the results.

关 键 词：城市生活垃圾 垃圾分类 垃圾收运企业 演化博弈 政府规制 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济] X799.3[环境科学与工程—环境工程]