消费者双重偏好对低碳供应链的影响研究  被引量:1

Research on the Impact of Consumers’Double Preferences on Low-carbon Supply Chain

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作  者:温廷新[1] 闫冬[1] Wen Tingxin;Yan Dong(School of Business Administration Liaoning Technical University,Huludao Liaoning,125000)

机构地区:[1]辽宁工程技术大学工商管理学院,辽宁葫芦岛125000

出  处:《情报探索》2020年第10期16-22,共7页Information Research

基  金:国家自然科学基金项目“基于大数据的煤与瓦斯突出的预测方法与应用研究”(项目编号:71771111);辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目“辽宁新型城镇化评价指标体系研究”(项目编号:L14BTJ004)成果之一.

摘  要:[目的/意义]旨在基于消费者渠道偏好挖掘消费者低碳偏好对低碳供应链的影响。[方法/过程]考虑由制造商和零售商构成的闭环供应链,运用Stackelberg博弈理论,研究双渠道供应链的条件下,不同减排模式的对比分析,寻求低碳供应链的最优减排模式。[结果/结论]联合减排策略比单一制造商减排对于制造商和零售商来说都更有利。不同减排模式的均衡解由消费者的低碳偏好决定,低碳敏感系数较大时,联合减排的均衡解更优;低碳敏感系数较低时,单一制造商减排模式的均衡解更优;低碳敏感系数中立时,两者的均衡解相同。制造商可以通过升级低碳技术、优化碳管理等方式降低减排成本、提高消费者对低碳产品的认可度。[Purpose/significance]The paper is to explore the impact of consumer low-carbon preference on low-carbon supply chain based on consumer channel preferences.[Method/process]Considering the closed-loop supply chain composed of manufacturers and retailers the paper uses Stackelberg game theory to study the comparative analysis of different emission reduction models under the condition of dual-channel supply chains and seeks the optimal emission reduction model for low-carbon supply chains.[Result/conclusion]The joint emission reduction strategy is more beneficial for manufacturers and retailers than a single manufacturer.The equilibrium solution of different emission reduction models is determined by consumers’low-carbon preferences when the low-carbon sensitivity coefficient is large the equilibrium solution of the joint emission reduction is better;when the low carbon sensitivity coefficient is lower the equilibrium solution of the single manufacturer’s emission reduction model is better;when the low carbon sensitivity coefficient is neutral the equilibrium solution of the two is the same.Manufacturers can reduce emission reduction costs and improve consumer recognition of low-carbon products by upgrading low-carbon technologies and optimizing carbon management.

关 键 词:低碳供应链 渠道偏好 低碳偏好 STACKELBERG博弈模型 

分 类 号:C93[经济管理—管理学]

 

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