内部控制缺陷披露、金融中介监督与债券融资成本  

Internal Control W eakness Disclosures,Financial Intermediary Monitoring,and the Cost of Publicly Traded Debt

作　　者：武恒光 张雪漫 孙华 Hengguang Wu;Xueman Zhang;Hua Sun

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院 [2]爱荷华州立大学商学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2020年第1期17-70,共54页China Accounting Review

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(16YJC790110);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2016GM17);2019年山东省研究生教育优质课程“内部控制理论”、全国会计领军(后备)人才培养项目(学术类)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：基于我国一级债券发行市场和二级债券交易市场,本文研究内部控制缺陷披露对债券融资成本的作用以及金融中介监督的调节效应。研究表明披露内部控制缺陷公司的债券融资成本更高,高声誉承销商、评级机构及银行监督能够弱化内部控制缺陷对债券融资成本的风险效应;但上述发现仅存在于重大缺陷公司。此外,一级债券发行市场存在政府隐性担保效应,弱化了内部控制缺陷引发的债券融资风险疑虑,二级债券交易市场中国有企业与地方政府的信用关联度减弱,内部控制缺陷信息被信用债定价吸收。本文有助于丰富债券定价、内部控制及金融中介相关文献,为债券市场价格机制改革提供政策依据。This study examines whether the cost of publicly traded debt is affected by internal control weakness disclosures and whether financial intermediary monitoring appears to mediate the relationship.Based on data from China’s primary bond market and secondary bond market for the period 2012-2017,we find that companies who disclose a material weakness suffer a higher credit spread,and the result is more pronounced for firms that are not monitored by higher reputation underwriters,credit rating agencies,or banks.Moreover,implicit guarantee from government existing in the primary bond market can mitigate the risk concern arising from the internal control weakness disclosure,and the weak association between SOE and government credit in the secondary bond market facilitate the debt price absorbing the internal control weakness information.Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding publicly traded debt pricing and financial intermediary.

关 键 词：内部控制缺陷 金融中介监督 债券融资成本 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275