控股股东股权质押与会计信息可比性——基于债权人风险防范的视角  

Controlling Shareholder’s Share Pledge and Accounting Information Comparability:a Perspective from Creditors’Risk Management

作　　者：田高良[1] 田皓文 吴思锐 施诺 Tian Gaoliang;Tian Haowen;Wu Sirui;Shi Nuo

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]香港城市大学商学院,香港999077 [3]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2020年第10期35-46,58,共13页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金“媒体报道发挥公司治理作用的机制研究:理论分析与实证检验”(项目编号:71372163);国家自然科学基金“网络舆情对企业绩效与股票价格的影响机制及管理方法研究”(项目编号:71672141)。

摘　　要：接受股权质押的债权人需要依据公司信息来防范风险,因此对上市公司会计信息质量有较高需求,并可根据“股权质押协议”向出质股东提出要求,进而影响公司信息质量。基于这一逻辑,本文实证检验了2007—2017年中国A股上市公司控股股东的股权质押行为与会计信息可比性的关系,发现:控股股东股权质押会显著促进公司提升会计信息可比性,且这种正向影响在非国有企业、股票流动性较差的企业以及股权集中度较高的企业更加显著。本文对从债权人角度分析股权质押行为以及会计信息可比性的相关研究有增量贡献。Creditors accepting equity pledge need to control risks based on high-quality accounting information of listed companies and,therefore,demand shareholders to improve information quality,which may have significant effects on companies’information.According to this rationale,we examine,during 2007 to 2017,the relationship between controlling shareholder’s share pledge of listed companies and their accounting information comparability in the Chinese A-share market,and find that controlling shareholder’s equity pledge could significantly promote the company’s accounting information comparability.Further research shows that such positive impact is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises and companies with lower stock liquidity or lower ownership concentration.This study contributes to the analysis of equity pledge behavior from the perspective of creditors and relevant research on accounting information comparability.

关 键 词：股权质押 控股股东 会计信息可比性 企业契约理论 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]