如何做一个彻底的知识外在论者  

How to Be an Utter Epistemic Externalist

作　　者：任会明 REN Huiming(Institute of Mind and Cognition,Shandong University(Qingdao),Qingdao,Shandong,266237)

机构地区：[1]山东大学(青岛)心智与认知研究所,山东青岛266237

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2020年第9期33-39,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：通过讨论为什么诺奇克的"追踪-真"外在论知识理论仍旧没有能摆脱盖梯尔问题的困扰,我表明现有的外在论知识理论中残留着一个内在论的关键主张,即感觉经验是提供辩护的最终来源。随后,我简略的刻画了一个抛开这个残留后的外在论知识理论的图景。I show that the current externalist epistemological theories still embrace a critical claim from the internalists’ camp,namely,that sensory experiences are the ultimate source of justification for our beliefs about the external world,by discussing why Nozick’s truth-tracking theory is still bothered by the Gettier Problem.I then sketch a picture of an utter externalist epistemological theory that does not fall prey to this seductive claim.

关 键 词：盖梯尔问题 外在论知识理论 感觉经验 辩护 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]