竞争性国企纵向价格垄断协议的认定原则——结合茅台、五粮液纵向价格垄断案  

On the Determination Principle of Vertical Price Monopoly Agreement of Competitive State-Owned Enterprises in Combination with the Cases of Maotai and Wuliangye Vertical Price Monopoly

作　　者：林星阳 LIN Xingyang(School of Law,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian 361005,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学法学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《中国石油大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第5期74-82,共9页Journal of China University of Petroleum (Edition of Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(16BFX143)。

摘　　要：中美贸易摩擦相关话题再次对我国国企提出审视。当年备受关注的茅台、五粮液纵向价格垄断案,与同年一般企业纵向限价案的裁判原则、依据存在天壤之别,暴露出现行反垄断立法对于规制国企相关行为的适用性分歧较大,该问题至今未决。国企分为竞争性和公益性国企,前者又分先天与后天竞争性国企,由于过渡时期后天竞争性国企的特殊性,倘以现行立法适用于规制国企相关行为为前提,对竞争性国企全然照搬现行立法中的原则、依据对其纵向限价行为加以认定并不可行,因此结合实证研究,认为竞争性国企纵向价格垄断应以双重分析标准为指引塑造认定原则,并设置相匹配的专门认定方法。Chin's state-owned enterprises are put under examination once again by the Sino-US trade friction related topics.The big difference in the judgment principle and basis between the cases of Maotai and Wuliangye vertical price monopoly and the vertical price limit case of general enterprises happened in the same year reveals the dispute about the applicability of current anti-monopoly legislation to regulating state-owned enterprises related behavior.The issue remains unsolved until now.If we take it as the prerequisite that the current legislation is applicable to the regulation of state-owned enterprises,it is infeasible to adopt the principle and basis of the current legislation to determine vertical price limit behavior of competitive state-owned enterprises.Therefore,according to the empirical research,the vertical price monopoly of competitive state-owned enterprises should be guided by the double analysis standard to shape the determination principle and set up a special identification method matching the basic principle.

关 键 词：竞争性国企 纵向价格垄断协议 规制原则 双重分析标准 专门认定方法 

分 类 号：D912.294[政治法律—民商法学]