公务员职级套改政策的变通执行逻辑  

The Flexible Execution Logic of Civil Servant Grade Reform Policy

作　　者：毛劲歌[1] 叶玮 李化敏 Mao Jinge;Ye Wei;Li Huamin(School of Public Administration,Hunan University.Changsha 410006)

机构地区：[1]湖南大学公共管理学院,长沙410006

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2020年第9期80-84,共5页Chinese Public Administration

基　　金：湖南省社科基金项目“两型社会建设中的公共政策执行机制研究”(编号:2010YBB063)。

摘　　要：政策的“变通”执行现象在政府管理实践中屡有发生,构成了政策过程研究的焦点议题之一。公务员职级套改政策涉及政府内部调整,研究其变通执行的内在逻辑能够帮助政府在推动该类政策执行时找准着力点,减少政策执行“梗阻”现象。本文以公务员职级套改政策在我国南方某省份B市的执行情况为案例,重点描述了上下级政府围绕该政策发生的正式谈判、非正式谈判以及“准退出”的互动,展现了该政策变通执行中的政策冲突和执行风险全过程。The phenomenon of“flexible”policy implementation occurs frequently in government management practices,and constitutes one of the focus topics of policy process research.The civil servant grade reform policy involves the government’s internal adjustments,studying the internal logic of its flexible implementation can help the government to find the right point and reduce the“Obstruction”of policy implementation.This article takes the implementation of the civil servant grade reform policy in a province B city in southern China as a case,focusing on the formal negotiations,informal negotiations and“quasi-exit”interactions between the higher and lower levels of government around the policy,showing the whole process of policy conflicts and implementation risks in the implementation of this policy.

关 键 词：职级套改 政策变通执行 政府间谈判 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]