股权集中度、经营性负债占比与代理成本——以我国民营制造业企业为例  

Ownership concentration ratio,operating liability ratio and agency cost:case of private manufacturing enterprises in China

作　　者：田爱国[1] 刘宇 TIAN Ai-guo;LIU Yu(School of Economics and Management,Qiqihar University,Qiqihar 161006,China)

机构地区：[1]齐齐哈尔大学经济与管理学院,黑龙江齐齐哈尔161006

出　　处：《沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第5期417-421,共5页Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划扶持共建项目(19EDE341);黑龙江省教育科学“十三五”规划备案课题(GJC1319124);黑龙江省高等教育教学改革一般研究项目(SJGY20190739);齐齐哈尔大学教育科学研究项目。

摘　　要：根据我国2014—2018年民营制造业上市公司数据,研究股权集中度、经营性负债占比和代理成本之间的关系。研究发现,企业经营性负债占比与第一代理成本之间呈显著正相关,股权集中度与代理成本之间呈显著负相关,即经营性负债占比越大代理成本越高,提高股权集中度可以有效抑制代理成本升高。进一步研究发现,在企业引入负债无法发挥外部监督作用时,可以提高股权集中度弥补总体监督力度的不足,从而有效抑制经理人对股东的代理成本升高。By studying the data of listed private manufacturing companies in China from 2014 to 2018,the relationship is studied between ownership concentration ratio,operating liability ratio and agency cost.It is found that there is a significant positive correlation between the proportion of operational liabilities and the first agency cost,and a significant negative correlation between ownership concentration ratio and agency cost.Namely,the higher the proportion of operational liabilities,the higher the agency cost,and increasing the ownership concentration ratio can effectively restrain the ascending of agency cost.Further research shows that when enterprises cannot achieve the effect of external supervision by introducing liabilities,they can improve the ownership concentration ratio to make up for the lack of overall supervision,so as to effectively restrain the ascending of agency cost of managers to shareholders.

关 键 词：民营制造业 股权集中度 经营性负债 代理成本 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济]