房地产抵押价值、高管公职经历与资源重配——基于公司层面的经验证据  

Real Estate Collateral Value, Executive’s Working Experience in Public Office and Resource Reallocation——Firm-Level Evidence

作　　者：钟腾 汪昌云[2] 祝继高[3] TENG ZHONG;JIGAO ZHU;CHANGYUN WANG(University of International Business and Economics;Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学金融学院 [2]中国人民大学中国财政金融政策研究中心 [3]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2020年第3期935-958,共24页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71703018、71790604、71772037和71874194);对外经济贸易大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(CXTD8-01)的资助。

摘　　要：本文旨在研究房地产抵押价值如何影响公司内部的资源配置,以及高管公职经历在其中所起的作用。结果显示,房地产抵押价值的上涨导致公司投资结构发生转变:公司房地产相关的资本支出显著上升,而房地产无关的资本支出下降。高管公职经历提供了进入管制性行业和获得长期贷款的便利,会加剧公司的房地产多元化行为,且这种效果主要集中于高融资约束企业和非国有企业中。这些发现对经济转型背景下更好地引导资金流向实体经济提供了参考。We investigate how real estate collateral value affects the resource allocation within a firm and the role played by the executive’s working experience in public office. We find that the collateral value appreciation leads to changes of firm investment structure. Real estate-related capital expenditures increase significantly, while real estate-unrelated capital expenditures decrease. Since the executive’s working experience in public office facilitates entry into regulatory industries and access to long-term loans, it aggravates firms’ diversification behavior and this effect is mainly concentrated among financially-constraint firms and non-state-owned enterprises. These findings provide references for guiding the flow of funds to the real economy under the background of economic transformation.

关 键 词：抵押品价值 高管公职经历 资源重配效应 

分 类 号：F299.23[经济管理—国民经济] F272.91F275