社会分歧议题立法中的司法政治与“公投”政治博弈——对台湾地区同婚立法过程的一项分析  

Judicial Politics and Political Game of“Referendum”in Legislation of Social Cleavages—An analysis of the Legislative Process of the Same-sex Marriage in Taiwan

作　　者：吴维旭 Wu Weixu

机构地区：[1]清华大学公共管理学院、台湾研究院

出　　处：《台湾研究》2020年第5期33-41,共9页Taiwan Studies

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“台湾世代政治态度变动及其对两岸关系综合效应的实证研究”(项目编号:17BZZ076);清华大学自主科研支持专项:“台湾地区行政-立法的体制运作及其对两岸关系的影响研究”(项目编号:2019THZWLJ06)的研究成果。

摘　　要：社会分歧议题的立法往往会受到社会民意结构、选举代议机制及司法政治等诸多因素的影响。台湾地区同婚立法是典型的社会分歧议题立法,其立法过程充分展现出持有不同立场的社会团体与政党在行政、立法、司法三机构中的博弈折冲。由于台湾司法系统的“大法官”释法位阶高于全民“公投”,故反同婚“公投”的多数民意受到司法限制,倾向支持同婚的民进党在行政与立法两端组成一致政府形态,这些都是同婚立法加速的关键节点与政治机会结构,此立法进程显现出与主流民意有冲突而立法的特征。The legislation of social divergent issues is often influenced by many factors,such as public opinion structure,electoral representative mechanism and judicial politics.The legislation of the same-sex marriage in Taiwan is a typical legislation of social divergent issues,and its legislative process fully shows the game between social groups and political parties with different positions in three institutions,which include administration,legislation and justice.Since the rank of interpretation of the Constitution by the Chief Justice is higher than the outcome of the“referendum”,most of the public opinions in“referendum”which against the same-sex marriage are limited by the judiciary,and the DPP form a unified government that control administration and the majority of legislation,which are the critical juncture and political opportunity structure for the acceleration of the legislation on same-sex marriage.This legislative process shows the characteristics of legislation against the mainstream public opinion.

关 键 词：社会分歧 立法过程 司法政治 公民投票 

分 类 号：D675.8[政治法律—政治学]