数量干预还是价格干预?——延迟退休的策略及福利效果  

Quantity vs Price Regulation——Delayed Retirement Strategies and Social Welfare Effect

作　　者：张熠[1] 张书博[1] Yi ZHANG;SHUBO ZHANG(Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院,上海市200433

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2020年第4期1419-1440,共22页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71503154);上海财经大学2019年研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2019-375)的支持。

摘　　要：本文将"数量—价格干预理论"运用到过早退休的道德风险治理中。研究表明:这一道德风险的本质是一种正外部性。在完全信息时,以直接管制退休年龄为特征的数量干预等价于以缴费受益关联为特征的价格干预。在引入不确定性和异质性后,模拟表明我国现有的缴费受益关联力度远远不足。个体异质性越大,价格干预相对数量干预的比较优势越大。随着人口老龄化和经济增速减缓,这一优势会逐渐削弱,甚至出现反转,即有必要转为数量干预。In this paper,the"quantity-price trade-off theory"is applied to solve the moral hazard governance of early retirement.It shows that this moral hazard is a type of positive externality since the individual marginal benefit of delaying retirement is less than the social marginal benefit.When there is no uncertainty and heterogeneity,the quantitative regulation characterized by the direct regulation of retirement age is equivalent to the price regulation characterized by strengthening the relationship between contribution and benefit.As the uncertainty and heterogeneity are introduced,the numerical simulation shows that the existing price regulation is still far less than the optimal level;the higher the individual heterogeneity,the greater the advantage of price regulation compared with quantity regulation;with the population aging and the slowing down of economic growth,the relative advantage of price regulation is gradually weakened,and even there is a reversal point.

关 键 词：数量干预 价格干预 延迟退休年龄 

分 类 号：D669.6[政治法律—政治学] F249.2[政治法律—中外政治制度]