风险厌恶和广告促销下基于收益共享的补货协调政策  

Replenishment Policy of Supply Chain Coordination via Revenue Sharing with Risk Aversion and Promotional Advertisement

作　　者：代建生[1] 于诗妍 DAI Jiansheng;YU Shiyan(Kunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming,China)

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,昆明市650093

出　　处：《管理学报》2020年第7期1096-1106,共11页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71762021,71462023,71573025)。

摘　　要：在零售商风险厌恶且投放广告下,运用CVaR方法研究基于收益共享的补货协调政策。从风险厌恶的视角刻画了渠道协调的实现条件,探讨政策参数之间的关系以及协调政策的可行域。研究表明:补货政策增大了渠道协调的可能性,延迟供给率越高,残值越小,或紧急生产成本越低,渠道协调越有可能实现。协调政策参数满足以下关系:采购价格和补货价格是零售商收益共享比例(广告成本分担比例)的线性增(减)函数。特别地,风险厌恶、延迟供给率、残值或紧急生产成本的变动只影响补货价格,与采购价格无关。This study takes CVaR method to investigate supply chain coordination viaa revenue-sharing policy, where the retaileris is risk averse, and can improve demand of commodity through promotional advertisements, and exert emergency ordering after demand realization.From the perspective of risk aversion, it characterizes the conditions for supply chain coordinationto be achieved, and depicts relationships among policy parameters and feasible area of the coordination policies. It shows that supply chain coordination is achieved more likely with replenishment ordering than without replenishment ordering. What’s more, the higher the rate of delayed supply is, the smaller the salvage value is,and the lower the emergency production cost is, the more likely the supply chain coordination will be realized. In order to achieve channel coordination, there must exist the following relationships among the policy parameters: Both purchase price and replenishment price are linearly increasing in revenue sharing ratio of the retailer,and linearly decreasing in advertising cost allocation ratio of the retailer. In particular, changes of the parameters such as risk aversion of the retailer, delayed supplyrate, salvage value and emergency production cost, only affect the replenishment price, but have nothing to do with the purchase price.

关 键 词：供应链协调 补货政策 风险厌恶 促销广告 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]