基于服务差异的双寡头航空公司定价策略与博弈分析  

Game Analysis and Pricing Strategy of Duopoly Airline Based on Service Difference

作　　者：刘聪灵 李程[1] LIU Cong-ling;LI Cheng(School of Air Transportation,Shanghai University Of Engineering Science,Shanghai 201620,China)

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学航空运输学院,上海201620

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2020年第19期56-63,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(15BJL104,18BJL039)。

摘　　要：基于航空公司提供服务的差异,建立了一种双寡头情形下的Hotelling博弈模型.根据得到各种服务差异情形下的纳什均衡解和各参数之间的影响,又探讨了机票价格和位置的关系,并通过数值仿真分析,得到不同服务成本系数下的结果.研究表明,当只有一家航空公司提供服务且服务成本系数越低时,另一家航空公司很容易被市场所淘汰.当两家航空公司均提供服务时,应保证服务成本系数在合理的范围内增加收益.Based on the service differences provided by airlines,this paper establishes a Hotelling game model under the duopoly situation.According to the Nash equilibrium and the influence of various parameters under different service differences,the relationship between pricing and location is discussed,and the results under different service cost coefficients are obtained by numerical simulation.Research shows that when only one airline provides service and the service cost coefficient is lower,another airline is easy to be eliminated.When both airlines provide service,the service cost factor should be guaranteed to increase revenue within a reasonable range.

关 键 词：HOTELLING模型 服务差异 定价策略 双寡头 

分 类 号：F560.6[经济管理—产业经济] F560.5