基于博弈视域下的农村低保对象识别研究  

Research on the Object Identification of Rural Minimum Living Security Based on Game Theory

作　　者：曾静 ZENG Jing(Public Administration College,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065)

机构地区：[1]四川大学公共管理学院,四川成都610065

出　　处：《南方农村》2020年第5期37-42,55,共7页South China Rural Area

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“农村最低生活保障与扶贫对象动态管理机制研究”(14YJC840004);重庆社会科学规划项目“精准扶贫目标下重庆农村因病致贫返贫治理机制研究”(2017YBGL138)阶段性成果。

摘　　要：我国农村最低生活保障制度(以下简称农村低保)全面实施已十多年,该制度较好地保障了困难群众的基本生活,为农村脱贫攻坚起到了很好的兜底保障作用。但由于各种原因,其在实施过程中存在诸多问题,影响了制度的实施效率和结果公平。文章运用经济学领域中的博弈理论,分析了农村低保对象识别过程中的博弈机理,并结合基层实际情况,提出包括建立道德和社会信用体系、建立收入量化指标、加强多方监督及构建信息化管理机制等措施,以期真正实现农村低保"应保尽保,应退尽退"的目标。China's rural minimum living security system(hereinafter referred to as the rural minimum living security)has been fully implemented for more than ten years.The system has better guaranteed the basic life of the poor people and played a good role in supporting the rural poverty alleviation.However,due to various reasons,there are many problems in the implementation process,which affect the efficiency of the system and the fairness of the results.Based on the game theory in the field of economics,this paper analyzes the game mechanism in the process of identifying the objects of rural minimum living security,and puts forward some measures,including establishing moral and social credit system,establishing income quantitative index,strengthening multi-party supervision and constructing information management mechanism,so as to realize the goal of"ensuring as much as possible and returning all the time".

关 键 词：农村低保 家庭收入识别 博弈 

分 类 号：F323.89[经济管理—产业经济]