农村振兴中资助信号博弈研究  

Signaling Game Model of Assistance in Rural Revitalization

作　　者：陈冬林[1] 郭娟 郭萌[1] CHEN Dong-lin;GUO Juan;GUO Meng(School of Economics,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学经济学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第5期99-106,共8页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：随着改革不断深入,设立农村发展资助项目推动农业发展,保障农民收入,是解决“三农”问题的有效模式。考虑到农村振兴中发展资助因信息不对称造成的逆向选择导致国家资助资金使用效率低、资源配置不合理问题,构建了申报单位与资助单位间的信号博弈模型,以资助单位收益最大化为目标,分析影响双方均衡选择机制的相关因素及均衡策略。结果表明,申报单位与资助单位博弈中出现混同均衡和分离均衡,均衡受到申报单位伪装成本、潜在收益等影响。基于此,开展了资助单位对农村单位的资助情况实证研究,提出增加申报单位伪装成本及提高潜在收益的政策建议,以期有效降低资助单位误判率,保障资助单位实行差异化资助,提高申报单位发展积极性,实现资助资金效益最大化目标,从而合理配置资源。With the deepening of reform,the establishment of the rural development funding projects to promote agricultural development and protect farmers’income is an effective way to solve the“issues relating to agriculture,rural areas and farmers”.Considering the adverse selection caused by information asymmetry in rural development funding,which leads to the low efficiency of the use of state funding and unreasonable allocation of resources,a signaling game model between application organizations and supporting organizations is established,and the relevant factors affecting the balanced selection mechanism of both parties are analyzed.It is found that“mixed equilibrium”and“separate equilibrium”appear in the game between applicants and the sponsors,and the equilibrium is influenced by the disguised cost and potential income of applicants.Therefore,an empirical study on the funding situation has been carried out,suggestions on increasing applicants’disguised cost and potential income are put forward,which can effectively reduce the false judgment rate of sponsors,guarantee the implementation of differentiated funding,improve the development enthusiasm of applicants,and guarantee the maximization of the funding efficiency and the rational resource allocation.

关 键 词：农村发展资助 信号博弈模型 均衡 资源配置 

分 类 号：F062.3[经济管理—政治经济学] F224.32