预期性债务违约会抑制企业避税吗?  

Does Expected Debt Default Curb the Corporate Tax Avoidance?

作　　者：袁业虎[1] 汤晟 张剑彬 YUAN Ye-hu;TANG Sheng;ZHANG Jian-bin(School of Accounting,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,China;School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2020年第10期33-49,共17页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71962010);国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(20ZDA047)。

摘　　要：有关债务契约的合同安排在影响企业避税行为决策过程中起到重要作用。基于2004-2017年中国沪深A股上市公司的样本,本文实证检验了预期性债务违约与企业避税之间的关系。研究发现,债权人诉讼前两年和前三年,预期到可能发生债务违约的企业会倾向于抑制避税。进一步地研究发现,激进的公司战略、高质量的内部控制会缓解预期债务违约企业对避税行为抑制作用的影响。本文的研究结论对于税收政策的制定与完善具有一定的借鉴意义。The contractual arrangement of debt contracts plays an important role in the decisionmaking process of corporate tax avoidance.Using the samples of A-share listed companies from2004 to 2017,this paper empirically tests the relationship between expected debt default and corporate tax avoidance.The study finds that the companies which expected a potential default two and three years before a creditor’s lawsuit tend to discourage tax avoidance.Further research shows that aggressive corporate strategies and high-quality internal control can mitigate the effect of companies that expected a potential default on tax avoidance.The research conclusion of this paper has certain reference significance for the formulation and improvement of tax policy.

关 键 词：债务契约 企业避税 公司战略 内部控制 

分 类 号：F810.7[经济管理—财政学]