行政竞标制、治理绩效和官员激励——基于国家卫生城市评比的研究  

Administrative Bidding,Performance,and Political Incentives——Evidence from National Health Cities

作　　者：刘松瑞 王赫[1] 席天扬 Liu Songrui;Wang He;Xi Tianyang(National School of Development,Peking University,Beijing,100871,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学国家发展研究院,北京100871

出　　处：《公共管理学报》2020年第4期10-20,164,共12页Journal of Public Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71874004);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(16JJD790003)。

摘　　要：作为国家治理能力的重要载体,地方政府面临着兼顾经济发展等主体治理目标和环境、公共卫生等非主体治理目标的挑战。本文以"国家卫生城市"的评选为例提出行政竞标制模式,分析了该模式对于非主体目标的治理绩效和官员激励的影响。利用当代中国官员数据库(COD)和城市统计年鉴数据,本文发现:(1)成功"创卫"的城市显著提升了环境质量;(2)经济增速处于省内中游的城市"创卫"概率最高;(3)成功"创卫"的主政官员的长期晋升概率比其同僚高出8.8个百分点。本文基于实证分析和制度沿革提出:行政竞标制的特征是中央政府设置议程,地方自主参与,围绕特定政策展开绩效评比和竞赛,由中央对优胜者予以表彰。该模式为改善非主体治理目标提供了正面激励,有助于推动多维度国家治理能力的平衡发展。Local governments often have to grapple with multiple policy tasks,ranging from primary objectives such as economic growth and revenue collection to secondary objectives such as public health and environmental protection.This paper argues that the performance and resource allocation on secondary objectives by local leaders are critically shaped by political incentives.We propose a theoretical framework of administrative bidding,which allows local governments to voluntarily respond to the initiatives of the central government and subscribe themselves to a performance competition around secondary policy agendas that would otherwise be underplayed following local governments’routines of policy implementation.Using the evaluation of National Health City by the state council from the 1990 s as a case in point,our paper investigates the interplay among local leaders’political incentives and their performance improvement on public health and environment through the campaign for National Health City.The empirical analysis using city-year level data comes down to three main findings.First,cities being rewarded the title of National Health City register a significant enhancement in the performance indicators on public health and environment.Second,cities are most likely to obtain the title of National Health City when their rankings of growth in gross domestic product(GDP)are located in the intermediate range within the province.Third,local leaders presiding over the cities through the campaign for winning National Health City are 8.8 percentage points more likely to be promoted in the long run.Altogether,these results attest to a model of administrative bidding,which helps align the incentives of the central and local governments on secondary policy objectives through a non-conventional,optional,performance competition.The mechanism of administrative bidding is conducive to a balanced approach for development and enhances the efficacy of political selection.

关 键 词：行政竞标制 非主体治理目标 治理绩效 官员激励 国家卫生城市 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]