政企网络关系、企业资源获取与经济效率——来自本地晋升官员离任的经验证据  

Government-enterprises Networks,Enterprise Resource Accessibility and Economic Efficiency:Evidence from the Departure of Local Officials

作　　者：卢圣华[1] 汪晖[1] LU Sheng-hua;WANG Hui(School of Public Affairs,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou,Zhejiang,310058,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310058

出　　处：《经济管理》2020年第10期5-22,共18页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

摘　　要：本地晋升的官员往往会在当地形成紧密的政企网络关系,而其离任会破坏原有的强政企网络,从而对企业产生影响。据此,本文将本地官员的离任作为自然实验,从反面探究政企网络关系对企业资源获取和经济效率的影响。基于2000—2015年332个城市市长、市委书记的详细资料和沪深两市上市公司的财务数据,实证发现本地晋升官员的离任会显著减少企业获得的银行贷款和政府补助,同时使企业的实际税率上升。相比于市长,市委书记的离任影响更大。其次,机制检验表明,这一影响是通过政企网络关系的破坏而实现的。按照企业的控制结构和行业类型对企业进行细分发现,本地晋升官员的离任对民营企业和工业企业的影响更大。本文进一步发现,本地晋升的市委书记离任后企业的全要素生产率有所提高,表明政企网络主导下的资源分配方式并不利于企业的持续发展。实证结论为政企关联的影响与后果提供了新的证据,并为深化“放管服”改革,推进政企分开提供了政策建议。Officials promoted from local tend to form close networks between governments and enterprises,while their departure will destroy the existing strong government-enterprises networks.On the other hand,enterprises in China to large extent rely on governments for economic resource access.Therefore,we suggest that the destruction of the networks between governments and enterprises caused by the departure of local officials would have impact on the resource accessibility and economic efficiency of enterprises.In the view that the appointment and transfer of officials are completely controlled by highly hierarchical governments,we view the departure of locally promoted officials as an exogenous event to estimate the value of government-enterprises networks for enterprises.By combining the detailed information of party secretaries and mayors in 332 municipal-level cities and financial data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen,this paper finds that the departure of local officials will significantly reduce the bank loans and government subsidies that companies receive,while at the same time increase the effective tax rate of the company.Compared with the departure of mayors,the departure of party secretaries has a greater impact.The results are quite robust facing a series of robustness checks,such as the change of dependent variables,dropping of some special samples.We also confirm that the mechanism is indeed the destruction of government-enterprises networks,rather than the uncertainty caused by the change of officials.In the section of further discussion,we test the heterogenous effect of the destroy of strong government-enterprises networks.We divide enterprises into sub-samples according to equity structure and industry respectively.Theoretically,we conjecture that private enterprises and manufacturing enterprises are more dependent on networks,which means they will be more severely affected facing the departure of local officials.This hypothesis is supported by empirical results,which prove that the destruc

关 键 词：政企网络关系 企业资源 全要素生产率 本地晋升 官员离任 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]