董事会战略决策权与组织间战略模仿——CEO权力的调节作用  

Board’s Strategic Decision-making Power and Interorganizational Strategic Imitation——Moderating Role of CEO Power

作　　者：邹国庆[1] 符瑞恒 ZOU Guoqing;FU Ruiheng(Jilin University, Changchun 130012)

机构地区：[1]吉林大学商学院,吉林长春130012

出　　处：《首都经济贸易大学学报》2020年第5期90-101,共12页Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“中国情境下制度环境对创新绩效的作用机制”(15BGL008);国家软科学研究计划项目“经济转型中的制度质量与区域创新能力:一个跨区域的实证研究”(2010GXS5D195)。

摘　　要：董事会对企业战略决策具有重要影响,决定着企业未来的发展方向和绩效表现。目前鲜有研究考察董事会对企业战略选择过程的内在影响机制。从CEO的继承决策出发,探索董事会如何通过战略决策权影响信息的收集和继任者特征进而对组织间战略模仿行为产生影响,同时还分析企业现任CEO对董事会决策作用的影响机制。基于291家民营企业的实证结果表明,董事会战略决策权对组织间战略模仿具有消极影响,内部继任者倾向在董事会战略决策权与组织间战略模仿的关系中起到部分中介作用,并受到CEO权力的负向调节。The Board of directors has an important impact on corporate strategic decision-making,which determines the future direction and performance of the corporate,while few studies investigated the internal influence mechanism of board on the process of corporate strategic choice.Based on CEO succession decision,this study explores how a board influences the collection of information and successor characteristics through the strategic decision-making power,and then influences the interorganizational strategic imitation behavior.In the meantime,this study also analyzes the influence mechanism of the current CEO on the decision-making process of the board.Based on the empirical results of 291 private corporates,it is found that the board's strategic decision-making power has a negative impact on interorganizational strategic imitation,and internal successors tend to play a partial intermediary role in the relationship between board's strategic decision-making power and interorganizational strategic imitation,which are negatively adjusted by CEO power.

关 键 词：董事会战略决策权 CEO继承 内部继任者 CEO权力 组织间战略模仿 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]