纵向关系、零售渠道选择和产品质量信号  

Vertical Relationship,Retail Channel Distribution and Product Quality Signaling

作　　者：杨万中[1] 蒋传海 YANG Wan-zhong;JIANG Chuan-hai

机构地区：[1]常州工学院经济与管理学院 [2]上海财经大学商学院

出　　处：《产经评论》2020年第5期5-22,共18页Industrial Economic Review

基　　金：教育部基地重大项目“高速公路产业竞争政策适用性与难点问题”(项目编号:16JJD790004,项目负责人:蒋传海);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究项目“企业纵向约束行为的竞争效应机理和对竞争政策的影响研究”(项目编号:2020SJA1266,项目负责人:杨万中)。

摘　　要：在现实经济活动中,许多产品既在网上销售又在实体商店销售,而通常是生产企业更了解市场上销售的一些产品的质量,消费者则对所要购买产品的性能与品质并不确切了解,这会减少消费者的支付意愿,也会影响生产企业的利润。生产高质量产品的企业为获得更大利润会通过激励某些行动来传递产品质量信息。建立博弈分析模型研究这类重要经济现象表明,当市场上销售的产品具有较大概率是低质量产品时,生产企业传递产品质量信息博弈会存在一个分离均衡:生产高质量产品企业通过多个渠道销售产品,而生产低质量产品企业仅通过一个渠道销售产品。由于多渠道销售产品将造成渠道竞争,使得生产企业的利润减少,只有生产高质量产品的企业才能承受这种损失,消费者可通过生产企业的销售渠道选择策略判断产品的质量状况,进而作出合理的消费决策。消费者虽然缺乏产品质量信息,但企业的行为并没有给其带来损失,公共政策部门采取过多措施来强制生产企业披露产品质量信息可能会导致消费者福利减少。In real economic activities,many products are sold both online and in brick-and-mortar stores,and the quality information of many products sold in the market is only fully understood by the manufacturer,consumers are not sure whether the goods they need to buy are high-quality products,which reduces the willingness to buy and also affects the profits of manufacturer.Firms that produce high-quality products have incentives to transmit product quality information through certain actions.This paper establishes a game analysis model to study such important economic phenomena.The results show that when the products sold in the market are low-quality products with a high probability,there is a separation equilibrium in the game of transmitting product quality information:the firms that produce high-quality products sell products through multiple sales channels,while the firms that produce low-quality products sell products through only one sales channel.Because the multi-channel sales of products make the channel competition reduce the profits of manufacturer,only the firms that produce high-quality products can bear this loss,so consumers can clearly judge the quality of products through the selection of sales channels of manufacturer,so as to obtain satisfactory consumption.Although consumers lack of product quality information,actions of manufacture do not bring losses to consumers,public policy departments take measures to disclose product quality information may reduce consumer welfare.

关 键 词：零售渠道竞争 质量信号 两部定价 信息披露 分离均衡 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]