重审巴斯·范·弗拉森的观察概念  

Reviewing the Observation Conception by Van Fraassen B C

作　　者：李元明 LI Yuan-ming(Institute for Science,Technology and Society,Center for the Study of Systems Science and Systems Management,South China Normal University,Guangzhou 510006,China)

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学科学技术与社会研究院系统科学与系统管理研究中心,广东广州510006

出　　处：《长沙理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第6期26-32,共7页Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology：Social Science

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学“十三五”规划一般项目(GD18CZX03)。

摘　　要：与17世纪至18世纪的英国经验论相比,科学哲学语境中的经验论重视不可观察与可观察之间的认识论差别。为避免理论负载论题的挑战,建构经验论的开创者巴斯·范·弗拉森采取了观察的对象性概念。与此同时,他坚持认为观察是独立的人类感知,完全否认科学仪器的认知价值。在科学实在论者与建构经验论者关于不可观察与可观察二分的攻防中,理论负载论题所扮演的角色颇为微妙。遗憾的是,由于忽视了科学观察的意向特征,巴斯·范·弗拉森的观察概念尚不能令人满意。Compared with the British empiricism of the 17th and 18th centuries,empiricism in the context of the philosophy of science values the epistemological difference between the unobservable and the observable.Bas van Fraassen,the founder of constructive empiricism,chooses the objectual notion of observation to avoid the challenge of the thesis of theory-ladenness.And he insists that observation is unaided human perception,and completely denies the cognitive value of scientific instruments.The role that the thesis of theory-ladennes plays in the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists about the unobservable-observable distinction(UOD)is rather subtle.Unfortunately,Van Fraassen′s notion of observation is unconvincing due to his neglecting the intentional character of scientific observation.

关 键 词：巴斯·范·弗拉森 建构经验论 观察 理论负载 科学仪器 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]