产品质量信号能提升竞价排名机制的信息匹配效率吗——基于中国搜索服务市场的分析  

Did Product Quality Signal Improve the Information Matching Efficiency of Bidding Ranking Mechanism--An Analysis Based on the Search Service Market in China

作　　者：蔡祖国 李世杰[2] CAI Zu-guo;LI Shi-jie(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;School of Economics,Hainan University,Haikou570228,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院 [2]海南大学经济学院

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2020年第10期100-118,共19页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金地区项目“互联网平台企业策略性行为及反垄断规制研究”(批准号71963012);海南省自然科学基金高层次人才专项项目“互联网平台企业核心特质、策略性行为与社会福利效应研究”(批准号2019RC040)。

摘　　要：考察搜索引擎的竞价排名机制所引致的付费搜索结果的信息匹配效果,不仅关乎消费者能否准确检索到偏好的销售商,而且关系搜索引擎优化信息匹配效率的具体措施及其方向。本文借助竞价排名机制经典文献中的模型框架,考察了搜索引擎同销售商间信息对称条件及信息不对称条件下的销售商竞价均衡,探索引致销售商逆向选择的前因及后果,进而阐释产品质量信号改善竞价排名机制信息匹配效率的理论机理,并结合产业实践数据,实证检验搜索引擎改善竞价排名信息匹配效率的治理效果。研究发现:由于信息对称条件下的销售商竞价均衡不能完全消除低产品质量的销售商获取最优付费位置的激励,低产品质量的销售商借助信息不对称的客观条件实施逆向选择行为,并通过提高投标金额获取最优付费位置,从而致使竞价排名机制的信息匹配功能,在信息不对称条件下完全失效。无效信息匹配引致的低消费者点击率促使搜索引擎引入产品质量信号。进一步地,搜索引擎通过设计指标权重,为销售商构建了“产品质量信号+投标金额”的加权指标,实现了最优付费位置的销售商同消费者的信息匹配,局部改善了竞价排名机制的信息匹配效率。本文建议,搜索引擎平台应当完善产品质量信号识别机制和量化评价机制;激励高质量销售商提高产品质量,竞争更优付费位置,进而提高产品质量信号向消费者传递产品质量信息的效果。When the search results provided by Baidu are increasingly unable to match the information needs of consumers,investigating the information matching effect of the search results caused by its main business model,that is bidding ranking mechanism,is not only related to whether consumers can accurately retrieve their preferred sellers,but also related to the specific measures and directions for the search engine to optimize the information matching efficiency.Using the model framework by the classical literature of bidding ranking mechanism,we examine the seller’s bidding equilibrium under information symmetry and information asymmetry between the search engine and the seller,and then explore the causes and consequences of the adverse selection of sellers.In addition,the theoretical mechanism that product quality signals improve the information matching efficiency of the bidding ranking mechanism is explained.Finally,combining with industry practice data,we empirically test the governance effect of the search engine to improve the matching efficiency of bidding ranking.We find that the bidding equilibrium under information symmetry between the search engine and the seller cannot completely eliminate the incentives for some sellers to obtain the optimal payment position.The objective information asymmetry between the search engine and the seller can lead some sellers to obtain the optimal payment position through adverse selection,so that the information matching efficiency of the bid ranking mechanism is reduced.Nevertheless,the introduction of product quality signals to construct a comprehensive index can only partially improve the information matching efficiency of the bidding ranking mechanism.Therefore,we suggest that the search engine platform should improve the product quality signal identification mechanism and quantitative evaluation mechanism,and encourage high-quality sellers to improve product quality to compete for better positions.Only in this way can the effect of product quality signals conveying p

关 键 词：竞价排名 信息不对称 搜索引擎平台 产品质量信号 

分 类 号：F260[经济管理—国民经济]