“怀疑”行为的决策机制及其词汇 意义的识解策略——基于信号博弈理论视角  

The decision mechanism of huaiyi(suspicion/doubt)behavior and the construal strategy of its lexical meanings:From a signal game theory perspective

作　　者：鲁承发 Lu Chengfa

机构地区：[1]上海师范大学人文学院,200234

出　　处：《语言教学与研究》2020年第6期94-103,共10页Language Teaching and Linguistic Studies

基　　金：国家社科青年项目"互动语言学视阈下汉语羡余否定现象研究(编号:16CYY044)"阶段性成果;上海师范大学“比较语言学与汉语国际传播”创新团队支持。

摘　　要：怀疑行为可看作信号博弈行为,它有两种类型:推测行为和质疑行为。前者关注哪种信号发送者类型最值得相信,其决策机制遵循期望效用最大化定理;后者关注本信号发送者类型是否可以确信,其决策机制是,只要有一丝疑虑,就宁信其假,不信其真。怀疑行为的决策机制导致“疑善信恶”与“疑恶信善”并存、“疑常信罕”与“疑罕信常”并存,它们看似矛盾,实则遵循着一致的理性原则。“怀疑”的意义可以根据“信号”与“类型”的匹配关系识解,并且在集体意向支配下,又规约出“宾语句法特点”“疑善信恶”等识解策略。Huaiyi(怀疑)(suspicion/doubt) behavior can be regarded as a signal game behavior. It has two types: suspicion behavior and doubt behavior. The former focuses on which signal sender type is the most trustworthy, and its decision mechanism follows the expected utility maximization theorem. The latter focuses on whether the signal sender type can be believed, and the decision mechanism is that, as long as there is a doubt, it is better to disbelieve. The decision mechanisms of huaiyi behavior leads to the co-occurrence of "to believe the bad and the good" and "to believe the frequent and the infrequent", which appears contradictory but in fact follows the principle of consistent rationality. The lexical meanings of huaiyi can be construed according to the matching relationship between the signal and the type. Moreover, under the influence of language convention, some simpler construal strategies have emerged.

关 键 词：怀疑 决策机制 意义识解策略 信号博弈 

分 类 号：H146[语言文字—汉语]