Analytic Phenomenology(or"What It Is Like")vs.Husserlian Phenomenology  

作　　者：Heath Williams 

机构地区：[1]Department of Philosophy,Sun Yat-sen University,Zhuhai 519082,China

出　　处：《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2020年第3期427-450,共24页中国哲学前沿（英文版）

摘　　要：I begin this paper by outlining two senses of"phenomenology."First,the"what it is like"or"analytic tradition"sense:the verbalization of qualitative states of consciousness of which we are aware.Second,the"Continental"sense:the rigorous study of the structures of consciousness.I outline the ways in which these two senses diverge.First,Continental phenomenology involves a diversified account of consciousness,states of awareness,and the human person.The phenomenologist articulates this account not by introspection but via acts of phenomenological reflection concerning eidetic intuitions about essential structural features.Second,via the method of"sense explication,"the phenomenologist can articulate an account of passive and subconscious states which we are not strictly"aware"of.The conclusion shows these divergences of senses are sometimes overlooked,leading to equivocation.Zahavi and Gallagher must be employing the"what it is like"sense when they make certain"phenomenological"arguments concerning social cognition,yet Spaulding's ensuing critique of phenomenology is directed at Continental phenomenology.Also,it is only phenomenology in the"what it is like"sense which cannot contribute to subpersonal psychology.Genetic Continental phenomenology describes the lawful relations amongst the precursors and preconditions which give rise to conscious experience,constituting a type of(non-causal)subpersonal explanation.

关 键 词：awareness phenomenological reflection passivity and the unconscious genetic phenomenology the simple phenomenological argument subpersonal psychology 

分 类 号：O17[理学—数学]