利益背反作为打破串谋的一般策略研究——兼对诺奖得主梯若尔“防范串谋原理”的批评  

Reverse Benefit as a General Strategy to Break Cooperative Game—With a Critical Evaluation of Jean Tirole's Principle of Preventing Collusion

作　　者：邓曦泽 Deng Xize

机构地区：[1]四川大学国际关系学院,成都610064

出　　处：《四川大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2020年第6期161-173,共13页Journal of Sichuan University：Philosophy and Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“冲突与协调——以春秋战争与会盟为中心”(13FZZ006);四川大学中央高校基本科研业务费研究专项项目(skqx201101)。

摘　　要：串谋是经济、政治及其他社会生活中的常见现象,而利益背反是打破串谋的一般策略。运用此策略,以行贿受贿为例,可将之分为受贿阶段和完成阶段。在受贿阶段,只要受贿者主动举报,则他不但无过,反而有功,而对行贿者则予以惩罚;在完成阶段,奖惩关系相反。若此,双方的利益构成背反,并成为利益敌人,从而提高腐败暴露概率。此策略具有诸多特点:不需要考虑信息对称性、中立性、操作性强、成本低、适用范围广。与同时惩罚策略、囚徒困境策略、防范串谋原理和财产公示制度相比较,利益背反策略具有明显优势。此外,利益背反策略可以被推广,成为打破一切合作博弈的一般策略。Collusion is a common phenomenon in economic,political and other aspects of social life.Reverse benefit is a general strategy to break the collusion,or,the cooperative game.Taking anti-corruption as an example.The application of the reverse benefit strategy means that in the venality stage,if the bribee voluntarily reveals the briber,then the bribee is not prosecuted and can be rewarded,but the briber will be prosecuted;and that the opposite is true in the completion stage.In this case,the interests of both sides constitute a betrayal and become enemies of interests,thus increasing the probability of exposing corruption.This strategy has many advantages:a disregard of information symmetry,neutrality,strong operability,low cost,and a wide range of application.By comparison,it is superior not only to the simultaneous punishment strategy,but also to the prisoner's dilemma strategy and the“the principle of preventing collusion”proposed by Jean Tirole,the 2014 Nobel laureate in economics.If used in the field of anti-corruption,the reverse benefit strategy is more effective than the property publicity system.

关 键 词：利益背反 串谋 合作博弈 收益 风险 腐败暴露概率 

分 类 号：D262.6[政治法律—政治学]