法治还是政治?——欧盟治理中的策略性容忍违规行为解析  

Rule of Law or Rule of Politics?An Analysis of Strategic Tolerance of Noncompliance in the European Union

作　　者：张亚宁 Zhang Yaning

机构地区：[1]柏林自由大学柏林全球与跨国问题研究院(BGTS)

出　　处：《国际政治研究》2020年第5期61-85,6,共26页The Journal of International Studies

摘　　要：欧盟委员会是欧盟法律执行的监督者。当面对成员国的违法行为时,欧盟委员会会有选择地、策略性地容忍部分违法行为。与合规意愿相比,成员国合规能力的不足是欧盟委员会做出策略性容忍决定的主要原因,此外,合规能力不足需要通过客观和可信的信号获得欧盟委员会的认可。这表明,欧盟成员国的合规水平并不能真实反映欧盟治理的有效性。虽然策略性容忍违规行为能在短期内提供欧盟治理急需的灵活性,但它会挫伤欧盟法律体系长期的权威性和稳定性。The European Commission oversees the implementation of EU laws.When faced with member states’non-compliance,the European Commission might selectively and strategically tolerate specific wrongdoings.This article finds that member states’inability to comply is the primary consideration behind acceptance of non-compliance.The lack of complying capacity needs to be accredited by the Commission by objective and reliable means.Thus the practice of tolerating non-compliance may not be a good indicator of the governing effectiveness of the European Union.Although it temporarily provides urgently needed flexibility,toleration of non-compliance could compromise the authority and stability of the European legal order in the long run.

关 键 词：地区与国别政治 欧洲 欧盟委员会 策略性容忍违规行为 合规能力 合规意愿 

分 类 号：D814.1[政治法律—国际关系] D99[政治法律—政治学]