双渠道供应链定价的量子博奕  

Quantum Game in Dual-channel Supply Chain

作　　者：张有中 CHANG Yuchung(School of Information Science&Technology,Xiamen University Tan Kah Kee College,Zhangzhou 363105,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学嘉庚学院信息科学与技术学院,福建漳州363105

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2020年第5期145-153,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management

摘　　要：基于量子博弈的观点探讨双渠道供应链的定价,构建双渠道供应链的量子博弈定价模型。双渠道供应链的制造商与零售商之间的竞合关系,可以视为一个量子纠缠现象。集中式决策下,制造商与零售商作为一个整体,以供应链利润最大化为目标,此时不存在量子纠缠,因此量子博奕模型的解与经典博奕模型的解一致。分散式决策下,随着制造商与零售商竞合加剧,量子纠缠度变大。当量子纠缠度大于零时,量子博奕的最优价格与最优利润皆高于经典博奕的最优价格与最优利润。当量子纠缠度趋于无穷时,量子博奕的最优价格最后保持收敛。因此量子博弈是比经典博弈更优化的决策方法。Based on the perspective of quantum game,the pricing of dual-channel supply chain was discussed and the quantum game pricing model of dual-channel supply chain was constructed.The competition and cooperation between manufacturers and retailers in a dual-channel supply chain could be seen as a quantum entanglement phenomenon. Under centralized decision-making,the manufacturer and the retailer as a whole aim at maximizing the profit of the supply chain. At this time,there was no quantum entanglement phenomenon,so the solution of the quantum game was consistent with the solution of the classic game. Under decentralized decision-making, as manufacturers and retailers intensify competition and cooperation,quantum entanglement became larger.The optimal price and optimal profit of quantum game were higher than that of classical game when the quantum entanglement was greater than zero. When the quantum entanglement tends to be infinite,the optimal price of the quantum game finally converges.Therefore,quantum game theory was a more optimal decision-making method than classical game theory.

关 键 词：量子博奕 经典博奕 双渠道供应链 量子纠缠度 定价 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]