考虑社会监督的建筑废弃物处置演化博弈分析  

Evolution Game Analysis on Construction Waste DisposalConsidering Social Supervision

作　　者：陈佳智 杨高升[1] CHEN Jia-zhi;YANG Gao-sheng(Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2020年第5期19-24,共6页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(71801082);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(18YJCZH148).

摘　　要：考虑到建筑废弃物违法处置具有明显的负外部性,基于多元协作治理机制,引入社会监督因素建立施工单位与监管部门建筑废弃物处置的演化博弈模型,分析不同社会监督水平对其行为策略的影响,并进行数值仿真。结果表明:社会监督不存在或水平较低时,系统不存在演化稳定策略;在监管部门缺少必要奖惩激励的情况下,可能出现治理失效的情况;社会监督水平的提高有利于抑制违法填埋行为,减少监管部门监管成本;当社会监管达到较高水平时,举报曝光的概率大于违法处理废弃物节省成本与风险成本的比值,施工单位群体会自发趋向于合规处理策略。据此,从公众参与和废弃物处置成本角度出发提出建议,为建筑废弃物治理提供参考。Considering the obvious negative externality of illegal disposal of construction waste,based on the multiple cooperativegovernance mechanisms,social supervision factors are identified to develop an evolutionary game model for construction wastedisposal between construction units and government regulatory depatrments.The influence of different social supervision levels ontheir behavior strategies is analyzed,and numerical simulation is performed based on the game model.The results show that there isno evolutionary stability strategy when social supervision is absent or at a low level.In the case that the supervision depatrment lacksthe necessary incentive of reward and punishment,the failure of governance may occur.The improvement of the social supervisionlevel is conducive to the suppression of illegal landfill behavior and the reduction of supervision cost of the supervision depatrment.When the social supervision reaches a high level,the probability of repotring exposure is greater than the ratio of cost-saving and riskcost of illegal waste disposal,and the construction unit will spontaneously tend to choose the compliance treatment strategy.Accordingly,from the perspective of public patricipation and waste disposal cost,suggestions for construction waste managementare proposed.

关 键 词：社会监督 建筑废弃物 演化博弈 

分 类 号：X799.1[环境科学与工程—环境工程]