基于实物期权的PPP项目政府担保与收益限制水平决策研究  

The Mode of Government Guarantee and Toll Revenue Cap of PPP Projects Based on on Real Option model

作　　者：雷晓莹 舒浩 刘继才[3] LEI Xiao-ying;SHU Hao;LIU Ji-cai(The Engineering&Technical College of Chengdu University of Technology,Leshan 614000,China;DongFang Electric Corporation,Chengdu 611730,China;School of Economics Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]成都理工大学工程技术学院,四川乐山614000 [2]中国东方电气国际工程公司,四川成都611730 [3]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2020年第5期114-118,共5页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71571149);国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(70901065);成都理工大学工程技术学院院级基金项目(C122017012)。

摘　　要：目前在PPP项目中,政府如何确定最低购买量担保及收益限制水平,决策者的类似项目经验对决策的影响较大,尚未形成一个完善的标准。这种不完善的现状使政府在PPP项目实施过程中做出的决策往往带有很大的主观性,并由此导致PPP相关各方风险分配的不合理。因此,基于实物期权理论,结合案例,建立政府最低购买量担保水平模型,以确定政府在PPP项目中应实施的最低购买量担保,建立收益上限模型确定相应的收益上限。研究有利于PPP项目的利益分配、风险分担,从而促进项目的顺利实施。How to confirm the minimum revenue guarantee and toll revenue cap depends on the relevant experience of decision makers in PPP projects.But there is no effective standard because minimum revenue guarantee and toll revenue cap are often subjective and thus leads to the unreasonable risk distribution in PPP projects.Based on the real option theory and PPP case,this study established a government’s minimum purchase guarantee level model to determine the government minimum purchase amount in PPP projects,and developed a revenue ceiling model to clarify the corresponding revenue ceiling.The findings are valuable to the interest distributing and risk sharing of PPP projects,so as to improve the project performance and promote the success of the project.

关 键 词：PPP项目 实物期权 最低购买量担保 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]