制造商资金约束的双渠道供应链定价与融资决策  

Dual-channel supply chain pricing and financing decision with manufacturer’s capital constraint

作　　者：周永务[1] 张雄[1] 李璐[1] Zhou Yongwu;Zhang Xiong;Li Lu(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China)

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510640

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2020年第5期670-688,共19页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71520107001,71871097)。

摘　　要：考虑资金受限的双渠道制造商存在风险厌恶行为,分别在制造商不融资,提前支付,银行贷款以及组合融资四种模式下,建立制造商–Stackelberg博弈定价模型.采用逆向求解法得到四种模式下供应链双方的均衡定价策略,进而探究制造商的融资策略.研究表明,制造商进行融资并采取单一的融资模式更有利.具体来说,当提前支付折扣因子大于银行利率时,制造商倾向于选择提前支付融资模式.反之,制造商的融资决策会受到多个因素的综合影响.最后,当拓展到零售商也风险厌恶且其风险厌恶信息私有时,有关制造商风险厌恶程度对其融资模式选择决策的影响的结论依然成立.Considering the risk averse behavior of the dual-channel manufacturer with capital constraint,the manufacturer-Stackelberg game pricing model is established under the four modes of manufacturer nonfinancing,prepayment financing,bank financing and portfolio financing.The backward induction is used to obtain the equilibrium pricing strategies of the supply chain in the four modes,and then the financing strategy of the manufacturer is explored.Results show that the manufacturer is better off financing and adopting a single financing strategy.More concretely,when the prepayment discount factor is larger than the bank loan interest rate,the manufacturer tends to choose the prepayment financing strategy.Otherwise,the manufacturer’s financing decisions will be affected by a combination of factors.Finally,when the retailer is also risk averse and its risk averse information is private,the conclusion about the influence of the manufacturer’s risk averse level on its financing strategy selection decision is still valid.

关 键 词：双渠道 资金约束 风险厌恶 提前支付 

分 类 号：F253.2[经济管理—国民经济]