无车承运人参与下的公铁联运主体利益博弈研究  

Game Research into Subjects Strategy of Rail-road Intermodal Transport under Different Decision Modes

作　　者：康凤伟 李雪梅[1] 李金宇 周逸薇 KANG Fengwei;LI Xuemei;LI Jinyu;ZHOU Yiwei(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China;Shenhua Railway Equipment Company Limited Beijing,Beijing 100011,China)

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044 [2]神华铁路装备有限责任公司,北京100011

出　　处：《铁道学报》2020年第11期22-28,共7页Journal of the China Railway Society

基　　金：科技部重大专项(2017YFB1201303-03)。

摘　　要：作为一种集高效、环保等优势于一身的先进运输组织形式,公铁联运通过充分发挥铁路与公路各自的运输优势,实现整个运输系统效率的提升。基于博弈理论,分析目前我国多式联运行业经济组织模式的特点,构建无车承运人参与下公铁联运系统的Stackelberg态博弈模型。通过对比分析公铁联运在不同组织形式下系统中的最优协议运量、最优协议运价策略及各参与主体利润,得出无车承运人有助于实现公铁联运参与主体协同的结论。研究表明,无车承运人作承运人可以保证系统总利润最优的同时,还能保证公路与铁路企业的利润相比得到提升。最后结合神池南—李天木铁路货运线路的实际数据对模型进行算例验证。Road-railway Intermodal Transport,an advanced transportation organization with advantages of high efficiency and environmental protection,is gradually developing and showing a trend of continuous blossom.Considering whether there is Non-truck Operating Common Carrier participate in the supply chain to coordinate,this paper construct a game model to analyze the profit of each participant from the perspective of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making,and the optimal strategies for each participant in different cases are obtained by solving the models.In the end,we calcualted the specific values of optimal strategies by the numerical simulation of the actual transportation route.The results reveal that:decentralized decision-making lead to a drop in profits.The total profit is the largest when Non-truck Operating Common Carrier participates as operator,and the transportation profit of both road and railway enterprises is larger than the other two modes in both two decision-making cases.

关 键 词：公铁联运 STACKELBERG博弈 无车承运人 

分 类 号：U15[交通运输工程]