中国高铁国际项目联盟收益分配研究  

Research on Revenue Distribution of International Project Alliance of China’s High-speed Railway

作　　者：张宇翔[1] 赵国堂[1,2] 周国华 ZHANG Yu-xiang;ZHAO Guo-tang;ZHOU Guo-hua(School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China;Ministry of Science and Information Technology, China State Railway Group Co. , Ltd, Beijing 100844, China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]中国国家铁路集团有限公司科技和信息化部,北京100844

出　　处：《预测》2020年第6期62-68,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：国家留学基金高水平公派研究生项目(201707000078)。

摘　　要：中国参与国际高铁项目合作通常采用与东道国企业组建项目联盟的模式,能否进行合理的收益分配,直接影响项目联盟内部企业的合作绩效,甚至影响项目的成败。本文通过考虑项目联盟的产权比例、工作贡献、风险承担三个因素,结合犹豫模糊数学方法和合作博弈理论,分析了国际高铁项目联盟收益分配形式。同时,以印尼雅万高铁项目为例对收益分配模型进行了验证,结果表明:考虑产权比例、工作贡献和风险承担的收益分配比单一考虑产权比例的收益分配更合理。China’s participation in international high-speed railway project cooperation usually adopts the mode of forming project alliances with host country enterprises.Whether reasonable revenue distribution can be made directly affects the cooperation performance of enterprises within the project alliance,and even affects the success or failure of the project.This paper analyzes the form of the revenue distribution of the international high-speed railway project alliance by considering the three factors of the project alliance’s proportion of property rights,work contribution,and risk-taking,combined with hesitant fuzzy mathematics and cooperative game theory.At the same time,the Indonesian Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway project is used as an example to verify the revenue distribution model.The results show that the revenue distribution that considers the proportion of property rights,work contributions,and risk-taking is more reasonable than the revenue distribution that only considers the proportion of property rights.

关 键 词：高速铁路 国际项目联盟 收益分配 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]