论环境税纵向利益冲突的法律调适——基于博弈论思维框架下的研究  

On the Legal Adjustment of Vertical Interests Conflict of Environmental Tax:Based on the Thinking Framework of Game Theory

作　　者：秦鹏[1] 段芮 QIN Peng;DUAN Rui(School of Law,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学法学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《长白学刊》2020年第6期78-84,共7页Changbai Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“环境风险规制的法律限度与秩序重构研究”(14XFX018);中央高校基本科研业务经费资助项目“环境治理的多元共治制度体系研究”(2017CDJSK08XK04);重庆市研究生科研创新项目“生态环境损害赔偿磋商制度研究”(CYS18037)。

摘　　要：环境税收制度实施过程中存在着各利益主体在税收负担的确认和分配过程中的利益博弈,其成功实施依赖于各相关主体利益冲突的妥善解决。现行环境保护税法难以有效应对纵向主体利益冲突所面临的困境,表现在政府规制所代表的社会环境效益与企业经济效益相互冲突、中央政府环境保护总体目标与地方政府局部经济发展难以平衡这两方面,而利益冲突主要是由环境税税率设置低效化、政府规制成本过高和税收收益归属单一所导致的。运用博弈论思维,构建博弈模型对各主体在环境税制之下的交互策略选择进行分析可知,提高税率水平、采取动态差别化税率、配合其他税种实行联动改革和将环境税收益非固定化分配的法律调适措施是破解纵向主体利益冲突,迈向合理制度设计的可行路径。The implementation of the environmental taxation system can be regarded as the interest game of the various stakeholders in the process of confirming and allocating the tax burden. The successful implementation depends on the resolution of the conflicts of interest of the relevant subjects. The current environmental protection tax law is difficult to effectively cope with the dilemmas faced by vertical subject conflicts of interest. These dilemmas are manifested in the conflict between the social environmental benefits represented by the government and the economic benefits pursued by the enterprises, and the unbalance between the central government’ overall goal in environmental protection and the local economic development of local governments. The conflict of interest is mainly caused by the inefficiency of the environmental tax rate setting, the over-regulation of government regulations, and the simplification of tax revenue. Using game theory thinking and constructing a game model to analyze the interaction strategies of each subject under the environmental tax system, we can adopt some legal adjustment measures such as improving the tax rate, adopting a dynamic differential tax rate,implementing linkage reform with other taxes, and non-immobilize the environmental tax revenue to break the conflict of vertical subject interests and move toward rational institutional design.

关 键 词：环境税 博弈论 利益冲突 税收收益 

分 类 号：D922.68[政治法律—环境与资源保护法学]