企业与政府间的创新信号传递与反馈研究  

Research on the Innovation Signals and Feedbacks between Firms and the Government

作　　者：冯潇 孟卫东[1] 黄波[1] 张尔聪 FENG Xiao;MENG Weidong;HUANG Bo;ZHANG Ercong(College of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2020年第8期63-79,共17页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(08AJY028,17XGL008);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(2018CDXYJG0040);重庆市研究生科研创新项目(CYB14005)。

摘　　要：针对补贴分配面临的隐蔽信息问题,探讨了企业R&D投入作为创新信号对政府补贴反馈的影响。首先,从信号传递理论的视角,阐述了企业传递潜在创新能力信息获取政府补贴反馈的内在动因与作用机理。随后,针对企业创新信号传递可能存在的两种内生性问题,利用改良的内生转换模型,检验了"十二五"期间我国上市公司R&D投入对补贴反馈的实际影响。结果表明:企业主动的创新信号示意对政府补贴反馈存在重要影响,传递高能力类型信号的企业获取了更多补贴分配;企业不同类型的创新信号传递对补贴反馈存在差异化的影响机制,并受到政府多元社会目标的综合影响。文章认为,政府应重视信念工具的有效利用,并对企业主动传递的创新信号给予实质性的反馈回应,合理安排企业预期信号收益、提高投机企业信号成本,以此提升补贴配置效率。In order to solve the problem of hidden information,this paper aims to investigate a possible impact of private R&D investment signals on the responsive allocation of public subsidies.From this perspective,the firm’s R&D decision is not merely a response to the incentive policies,it is a strategic signaling behavior to eliminate the adverse effect of hidden information.And the government’s subsidy decision is not only a static policy scheme,but a dynamic feedback mechanism to strategically foster the public belief.Therefore,unlike earlier efforts focusing on the effects of subsidies,this paper provides a new perspective for understanding firms’innovation decisions and the government’s innovation resource allocation.The structure of the article is:firstly,based on signaling theory,this paper explains how private R&D decisions reveal their potential innovation capabilities and affect the subsidy allocation process.Under the influence of a given common belief of the government,a firm chooses the level of innovation signal that maximizes returns under the constraint of signaling cost,which can help the government identify its potential innovation capabilities,and give reasonable feedback consistent with its capability types,and optimize the efficiency of subsidy allocation.Then,considering two kinds of endogenous problems that may exist while signaling,an improved Endogenous Switching Regression Model is used to test the actual impact of R&D signals on the allocation of subsidies within Chinese listed companies during the 12 th Five-Year-Plan period.The results show that:(1)innovation signals have an important impact on subsidy feedbacks.When a focal firm initiatively sends a high-capability type signal to the government,it will get more grants.Different types of innovation signals have different influence on the feedback mechanism.Moreover,the government decides the feedbacks with some other social goals as well.This paper suggests that the government should take more use of its belief and give substantial f

关 键 词：信号传递理论 R&D投入 政府补贴 内生转换模型 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学] F27