高校学生资助福利困境的非合作博弈向合作博弈的跃迁  

Transition from Non-cooperative Game to Cooperative Game in College Student Aid Welfare Dilemma

作　　者：王俊春[1] 段丹[2] 李凯敏[1] 张宇雁 赵兴国[1] Wang Junchun;Duan Dan;Li kaimin;Zhang Yuyan;Zhao Xingguo(BaoShan University;BaoShan Secondary Professional School,BaoShan Yunnan 678000)

机构地区：[1]保山学院 [2]保山中等专业学校,保山云南678000

出　　处：《保山学院学报》2020年第4期70-78,共9页JOURNAL OF BAOSHAN UNIVERSITY

基　　金：2019年度云南省哲学社会科学教育科学规划项目“高校资助育人中的福利困境和解决路径研究”(项目编号:AD19007)。

摘　　要：在论证高校资助育人中存在"福利困境"基础上,基于哈耶克—萨格登式"道德与惯例为同一社会演化过程的产物"的理论基础,构建学生资助育人对称模型和非对称模型,分析两种情形的演化稳定策略(ESS),并得出资助育人中"利德融合"的相关研究结论。The article argues that there is a"welfare dilemma"in college student funding.Based on Hayek-Sugden’s theoretical basis that"morality and convention are the product of the same social evolution process",a symmetric and asymmetric model of student funding is constructed.The paper also analyzes the Evolutionary Stability Strategy(ESS)of the two situations,and draws the relevant research conclusions on the"Lead Fusion"in college student funding.

关 键 词：资助育人 福利困境 非合作博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：H172.3[语言文字—汉语]