地方政策俘获的发生机理与防治对策--基于典型案例的一项研究  

Occurrence Mechanism and Prevention Countermeasures of Local Policy Capture:A Study Based on Typical Cases

作　　者：袁柏顺[1] YUAN Baishun(Center for Clean Governance,Hunan University,Changsha,Hunan 410082,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南大学廉政研究中心,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《广州大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第6期92-99,共8页Journal of Guangzhou University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金特别委托项目(2020MYB051);湖南省社科基金重大智库项目“如何有效治理公共资源交易中的腐败问题”[湘社科办(2019)]之阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：不同于“国家俘获”概念易引发争议和具有抽象性,“政策俘获”是一个更具体并可适用于不同场域的分析概念。基于对周集铁矿勘探探矿权案、亿中公司补偿耕地指标交易案的分析,可以发现我国地方政策俘获的发生机理包括企业与贪腐政府官员结成利益共同体、政策过程中层级政府信息不对称、会议决策与会议管理存在漏洞等。除了充分发挥市场在资源配置上的决定性作用、减少干预等防治政策俘获的一般措施,有必要结合当下实际情况,通过打破利益共谋、构建亲清政商关系,加强地方政府层级监督,规范会议制度等具体措施,有效防治地方政策俘获。Different from the concept of state capture,which is controversial and abstract,policy capture is a more specific analytical concept that can be applied to different fields.Based on the analysis of the Zhouji Iron Mine Exploration Rights Case and the Yizhong Company's Compensation Cultivated Land Index Transaction Case,it can be found that the mechanism of local policy capture in China the formation of a community of interests between enterprises and corrupt government officials lie in the existence of information asymmetry in the policy process of hierarchical governments,and loopholes in decision-making conference institution and meeting management,etc.In addition to giving full play to the decisive role of the market in resource allocation,reducing intervention and other general measures to prevent and control policy capture,it is necessary to base on the current actual situation in China,to break the collusion of interests,to build pro-Qing political and business relations,to strengthen local governments'hierarchical supervision,to standardize and institutionalize decision-making meetings,and to take other specific measures,so as to prevent local policy capture.

关 键 词：国家俘获 政策俘获 公共政策 公共资源交易 腐败防治 

分 类 号：D630..9[政治法律—政治学]