集体腐败的破解路径:基于博弈论的模型分析  

A Cracking Path of Collective Corruption:Model Analysis Based on Game Theory

作　　者：宋伟[1] SONG Wei(Anti-Corruption Research Center,University of Science and Technology Beijing,Beijing 100083,China)

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学廉政研究中心,北京100083

出　　处：《广州大学学报（社会科学版）》2020年第6期100-104,共5页Journal of Guangzhou University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(17CDJ005);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(17JZD007)。

摘　　要：近年来集体腐败成为社会和学者普遍关注的热点问题,也是当前腐败发生的显著趋势。集体腐败是多名腐败分子结成同盟、共同开展腐败行为的现象,具有极强的政治腐蚀性和经济破坏力。基于博弈论构建集体腐败单阶和多阶模型分析发现,通过降低腐败黑数、提高腐败被惩处的概率是治理集体腐败的关键,同时也应加强对腐败分子的心理干预,形成有效的内部人举报制度,构建科学的权力制约和监督体系,以此全面提升集体腐败治理的成效。Collective corruption has become a hot issue for the society and scholars in recent years. It means that the corrupt elements form alliances and carry out corruption together,which has a strong political corrosive and economic damage. Based on game theory, the construction of a single-order and multi-order model of collective corruption found that reducing the number of corruption blacks and increasing the probability of corruption being punished are the key to managing collective corruption. At the same time, it is also necessary to strengthen psychological intervention on corrupt elements, to form an effective insider reporting system, and to build a scientific power restriction and supervision system, so as to comprehensively improve the effectiveness of collective corruption governance.

关 键 词：集体腐败 博弈论 腐败治理 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学]