自我认知、关系认知与策略互动——对中印边界争端的博弈分析  

Self Recognition,Relationship Cognition and Strategic Interactions:An Analysis on the Escalation of the China⁃India Border Dispute from the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：叶海林[1] Ye Hailin(National Institute of International Strategy,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院亚太与全球战略研究院,100007

出　　处：《世界经济与政治》2020年第11期4-23,156,共21页World Economics and Politics

摘　　要：作者以近年来中印边界争端的演变过程为案例,运用动态博弈和博弈策略的相关理论,分析了洞朗事件后中国对印合作政策没有获得预期回报的原因。洞朗事件后中国对印政策建立在维护次要战略方向稳定的目标上,具有风险厌恶型策略的典型特征。通过将2017年洞朗事件、2018—2019年的中印互动以及2020年加勒万河谷冲突和班公湖南岸对峙视为中印两国间不完全信息可观察行动重复博弈,重点研究博弈过程中的双方策略互动,作者得出结论:国家在次要方向上的合作性策略能否取得预期效果与博弈过程中双方对支付结构的预期存在密切关联,次要方向上主要对手的自我认知和关系认知会对行为体的信号接收效果产生重大影响。国家应准确判断次要对手的自我认知和关系认知,避免因信号释放失当造成政策目标与手段不匹配的消极后果。因此,中国调整对印外交策略时,需要避免以希冀目标作为可能前景等多种认知偏差。Based on the continuous observation of ongoing China⁃India border conflict in recent years,the author intends to answer is why China hasn't yielded prospective policy returns from the Indian side,even if it has been pursuing a cooperative strategy towards India after the Doklam standoff.Inspired by several doctrines of game theory under the dynamic⁃game scenario and the application of relevant gaming tactics,this essay argues that after the Doklam standoff,China has been consistently pursuing an India policy that is risk⁃aversion in nature,represented by its fundamental goal of persevering stability in the secondaire direction of China⁃India border area.As a supporter of this argumentation,a diachronic investigation in terms of the evolution of China⁃In⁃dia relations between 2017 and 2020 was conducted,in which both countries were presumed as state actors involving in repeated gaming process with observable actions and asymmetric information sources.The investigation covers the respective actions adopted by both China and India since the Doklam standoff,in 2017,along with the strategic interactions between the two sides from 2018 to 2019,till the most recent standoff in the Galwan Valley and the standoff along the Panggong Tso in 2020.The major finding of this essay is that there exists a causal⁃effect relationship between the expected payment structures of both sides in a gaming process and the outcome of the implementation of a certain cooperative strategy.Besides,as opponents in a gaming process,either side's self⁃cognition and its evaluation on the bilateral relations will pose critical impact on its policy⁃making.Therefore,in the specific case of China⁃India border conflict,it is highly advised that China should make practical efforts to avert cognition risks of all kinds while managing its relation with India;otherwise,negative consequences may occur due to the mismatch of its strategic goals and its policy devices.

关 键 词：加勒万河谷冲突 多轮重复博弈 关系认知 中印边界争端 

分 类 号：D815[政治法律—国际关系]