基于激励博弈的供应链金融物流监管风险研究  

Thoughts on Risk Mitigation of Supply Chain Financial Logistics Supervision Based on Game and Incentive Theory

作　　者：储雪俭[1] 黄越 李佳阳 CHU Xue-jian;HUANG Yue;LI Jia-yang(Modern Logistics Research Center,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200072)

机构地区：[1]上海大学管理学院,上海200072

出　　处：《供应链管理》2020年第12期48-62,共15页SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

摘　　要：在供应链金融物流监管的实践中,物流监管企业与金融机构的利益不一致,以及物流监管人员的隐藏行为等往往会给供应链金融物流监管业务带来隐患。文章从供应链金融监管各参与者间的关系入手,构建供应链金融物流监管中的博弈模型。在此基础上,运用激励理论,构建金融机构与物流监管企业间的激励模型,以此达到缓释由于供应链金融物流监管中利益不一致造成的监管风险的目的。In the practice of supply chain financial logistics supervision,the interests of logistics supervision enterprises and financial institutions are inconsistent,and the hidden behaviors of logistics supervisors often bring hidden dangers to the supply chain financial logistics supervision business.In this context,this paper starts with the relationship between the participants in supply chain financial logistics supervision and constructs a game model.On this basis,the incentive theory is used to construct an incentive model between financial institutions and logistics supervision enterprises,so as to achieve the purpose of mitigating the supervision risks caused by the inconsistent interests in the supply chain financial logistics supervision.

关 键 词：供应链金融 物流监管风险 激励理论 

分 类 号：F831.5[经济管理—金融学] F252.1