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作 者:邢瑞利 Xing Ruili
机构地区:[1]南京大学国际关系研究院,江苏南京100872 [2]中共南通市委党校
出 处:《新疆社会科学》2020年第5期69-78,171,共11页Social Sciences in Xinjiang
基 金:国家社科基金青年项目“‘印太战略’背景下‘东盟中心地位’重构研究”(20CGJ029)的阶段性成果。
摘 要:文章聚焦印度对华强硬政策背后的非物质性动机,从国家声誉视角出发,引入观众成本和议价能力两个干预变量搭建起国家声誉动机作用于印度外交政策行为的理论分析框架。通过检验1962年“中印边界战争”、2017年“洞朗对峙”以及2020年“加勒万河谷边境冲突”三个案例后发现,正是由于印度国内存在高昂的观众成本,而边界议价能力又弱于中国,所以导致其在边界问题上频频展示强硬态度,维护国家声誉的意愿异常强烈。文章认为,基于维护国家声誉的考虑,印度与中国在边界问题上将会经历长期的博弈,需对印度对华政策进行持续关注。The article focuses on the non-material motives behind India's assertive policy towards China,and from the perspective of national reputation,it introduces two intervening variables,audience cost and bargaining power,to build a theoretical analytical framework for the role of national reputation motives in India's foreign policy behavior.By examining the cases of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war,the 2017 Donglang standoff,and the 2020 Garvan Valley border conflict,it is found that it was the India's high domestic audience costs and its weaker border bargaining power than China's has led to its frequent assertiveness on border issues and its strong willingness to protect its national reputation.The article argues that India and China will experience a long game on the border issue for the sake of maintaining the country's reputation.Therefore,it is necessary to pay constant attention to India's China policy.
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