基于双重信息非对称的排污权交易机制与最优环境政策设计  

Emission Trading Mechanism and Environment Policy Design under Information Asymmetry of Abatement Costandpollution

作　　者：李冬冬 吕宏军 李品[3,4] 杨晶玉 LI Dong-dong;LV Hong-jun;LI Pin;YANG Jing-yu(School of Humanities,Economic and Law,Northwester Ploytechnical university,Xi'an 710072,China;School of business,Xi’an University of Finance and Economics,Xi'an 710100,China;China Institute for Urban Governance,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China;School of International and Public Affairs,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China;Management School of Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049,China)

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学人文与经法学院,陕西西安710072 [2]西安财经大学商学院,陕西西安710100 [3]上海交通大学中国城市治理研究院,上海200030 [4]上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院,上海200030 [5]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2020年第11期219-230,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目(20BJY076);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71974081,71904152);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(19YJC630039);陕西省社会科学基金资助项目(2019S024,2018F004,2020R004);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(G2020KY05102)。

摘　　要：论文构建减排成本与排污双重信息非对称的污染物总量控制排污权交易机制设计模型,讨论排污权交易机制及最优的环境政策设计。研究结论表明:当排污权二级市场交易价格与排污税之和小于等于排污企业谎报惩罚成本时,排污企业自愿守法排污时的机制设计结果是最优的;当排污权二级市场交易价格与排污税之和大于排污企业谎报惩罚成本时,政府迫使排污企业守法时的机制设计结果是最优的。为迫使排污企业守法排放,一方面政府可选择一个最优的违法排污惩罚力度与监管相结合,最优违法排污惩罚力度受惩罚成本、监管力度等因素影响;另一方面,政府可采取措施降低单位监管成本。本研究为双重信息不对称情形下,排污权交易机制及环境政策设计提供了理论依据。An emission trading mechanism design model is constructed under information asymmetry of pollution and abatement cost.The design of optimal emission trading mechanism is discussed and the optimal environmental policy is given.The result shows that when firm voluntarily abides the law,the government should set the level of supervision at a reasonable level.When firm choose illegal pollution,the government forces the firm to abide thelaw.At this point,government needs to choose an suitable penalties.A theoretical basis for the decision-making of the government’s pricing,distribution mechanism,environmental regulation is provided.

关 键 词：排污权交易 政府监管 惩罚机制 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]